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RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS
Francesca L. Procaccini*
Our national political dysfunction is rooted in constitutionally
dysfunctional states. States today are devolving into modern aristocracies
through laws that depress popular control, entwine wealth and power, and
insulate incumbents from democratic oversight and accountability. These
unrepublican states corrupt the entire United States. It is for this reason that
the Constitution obligates the United States to restore ailing states to their
full republican strength. But how? For all its attention to process, the
Constitution is silent on how the United States may exercise its sweeping
Article IV power to “guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government.” As states descend into aristocratic cabals, the
question of how to enforce the guarantee is of existential importance. This
Article illuminates three enforcement mechanisms: direct legislation,
federal incentives, and reconstructing state governments. It establishes that
Congress, not the U.S. Supreme Court, is the institutional actor most capable
of addressing the republican rot now plaguing the states.
INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 2158
I. A GUARANTEE AGAINST ARISTOCRACY .................................... 2166
The Guarantee Clause’s Anti-aristocracy Origins ......... 2168
The Reconstruction of Slave Aristocracies ..................... 2171
The Anti-aristocracy Guarantee Power ......................... 2175
Distinguishing Between Aristocratic and Republican
Government .................................................................. 2178
II. THE ARISTOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS OF SEVERAL STATES.......... 2184
A.
B.
C.
D.

A. Entrenchment Through Partisan Gerrymandering ........ 2186
B. Criminal Disenfranchisement ......................................... 2190
III. ENFORCING THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AGAINST ARISTOCRATIC
STATES ................................................................................. 2195
A. Legislating Against Unrepublican State Practices ......... 2198
* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Visiting Lecturer in Law,

Yale Law School; Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School. I am
especially grateful to Jack Balkin, Richard Fallon, Michael Klarman, Martha Minow, Laura
Weinrib, and participants in the Information Society Project workshop, for invaluable insights
and comments.

2157

2158

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

B. Incentivizing State Political Reform ............................... 2201
1. Constitutional Conditions: States Passing Laws and
Amendments ........................................................... 2202
2. Constitutional Incentives: Financial Carrots and Seating
Sticks ....................................................................... 2204
C. Dissolving and Reconstructing State Government ......... 2208
IV. THE SEPARATION OF THE GUARANTEE POWER ....................... 2214
A. Congressional Predominance......................................... 2216
B. Judicial Restraint............................................................ 2221
1. Modest Review ........................................................ 2221
2. The Empty Promise of Judicial Enforcement .......... 2225
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 2230
INTRODUCTION
Something is rotten in the American states. Currently, fifty-nine million
Americans live under minority legislative rule in their states.1 Nearly half
suffer extreme misrepresentation under state legislatures whose political
makeup differs from the state’s popular vote by fifteen percentage points or
more.2 In some states, the legislature is stacked with 25 to 30 percent more
party members than that party won at the polls.3
A separate group of over five million adult citizens is explicitly deprived
of the right to vote by state law.4 This is more people than the total state
population in twenty-nine states.5 In six states—with a combined population
of over forty-nine million Americans—these disenfranchisement laws
prohibit between 6 and 11 percent of the adult citizenry from voting.6 Seven
states disenfranchise over 15 percent of their Black populations—two
disenfranchise over 20 percent.7
At the same time, it costs over three times the median household income
to win a state legislative seat.8 Nearly impenetrable class stratification

1. CHRISTIAN R. GROSE ET AL., THE WORST PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS IN U.S. STATE
LEGISLATURES 6 (2019).
2. Id. at 7–9.
3. Id. at 12–13.
4. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENT’G PROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2020: ESTIMATES OF
PEOPLE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A FELONY CONVICTION 4 (2020),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/locked-out-2020-estimates-of-peopledenied-voting-rights-due-to-a-felony-conviction/ [https://perma.cc/LV4F-3ZA6].
5. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States,
and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://files.hawaii.gov/
dbedt/census/popestimate/2019_state_pop_hi/nst-est2019-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TSSFADD] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
6. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.
7. Id. at 17.
8. See Geoff Mulvihill, Political Money in State-Level Campaigns Exceeds $2B,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://apnews.com/
b3ead0614b664bd89fbe1c8c19c42131 [https://perma.cc/KVY4-APGG].
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ensures that only elites can afford to run or win elections.9 Once in office,
representatives are nearly impossible to remove, even as they consistently act
solely in the interests of economic elites.10 The views of ordinary citizens
have little to no effect on the laws by which they are governed.11
What is rotting is the foundation of republican government in the states—
through modern-day manifestations of aristocratic governing tactics that
subvert popular control of government and create stark levels of political
inequality amongst citizens. In particular, the sum processes of widespread
voter suppression, political entrenchment, unresponsive governance, and
undemocratic ploys to subvert majoritarian rule are eroding republican
structures and allowing aristocratic rule to fester in its place. This is a period
of decay that rivals the worst episodes of republican crisis in American
history.
When confronted with a similarly egregious period of republican rot in the
wake of the Civil War, a reformist Congress embraced a radical idea to
deconstruct and reconstitute the foundations of American democracy in the
states. It used a little remembered power, thereafter forgotten again, to enact
a sweeping program of political and constitutional reconstruction. Article
IV, Section 4 of the Constitution12—the Guarantee Clause—was Congress’s
sledgehammer against unrepublican practices and its scalpel for sculpting a
new political equality. Under this authority, Congress fundamentally
reconstituted both the state and federal structures of political power,
including by dismantling the Southern states’ governments, requiring new
state constitutions, and orchestrating the ratification of the Fourteenth13 and
Fifteenth Amendments.14
It is now time for another major republican renovation of state
governments. The country is again at that same tumultuous crossroad of
severe republican rot, extreme partisan polarization, a legitimization crisis,
and constitutional gridlock that attended the postwar Reconstruction era. It
is therefore imperative in this moment to refocus attention on the
Constitution’s buried reset button: the Guarantee Clause.
Understanding how to use this power is of utmost importance and yet
critically underexamined. This Article presents a needed analysis of the
clause’s modern salience and modes of application. Relying on text, purpose,
9. See Richard V. Reeves & Nathan Joo, The Glass Barrier to the Upper Middle Class
Is Hardening, BROOKINGS INST. (May 11, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/socialmobility-memos/2016/05/11/the-glass-barrier-to-the-upper-middle-class-is-hardening/
[https://perma.cc/92XL-SFQ8] (citing studies showing increasing class stratification,
multidimensional poverty, and the unavailability of class mobility).
10. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 113 (2000).
11. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 565 (2014).
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
13. Id. amend. XIV.
14. Id. amend. XV; see Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section
4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 540–41 (1962); G. Edward
White, Reading the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 787, 801 (1994).
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and historical use, it reveals three enforcement schemes, each with their own
limits: (1) direct federal legislation, (2) congressional incentives—through
the carrot of monetary inducements as well as the stick of refusing to seat
uncooperative states’ representatives in Congress—and (3) dissolving a state
government and convening a state constitutional convention to replace it.
The guarantee power is thus a strikingly direct and potent authority for
remediating republican rot in the states—and therefore for remedying
political dysfunction at the federal level as well. In our federalist system of
government, the republican health of the states determines the democratic
vitality of the federal system as a whole.15 It is the states that are the
structural building blocks of federal political power. State delegations
comprise both legislative chambers of Congress. In the Senate, these
delegations serve a gatekeeping function for federal judicial and officer
confirmations.16 State governments have the prerogative to decide whether
to abide by most major federal policies, including education standards,
antidiscrimination laws, health care and welfare programs, and even
immigration policies.17 Upon opting in to federal policies and programs,
state governments then largely administer them through state and local
agencies. Even the president, ostensibly a nationally elected official, is
selected via a state ballot system fully within the control of each state’s
legislature.18
This composite state design of the national government ensures that
unrepublican practices at the state level lead to unrepublican outcomes at the
federal level. The obviousness of this truism should not mask the magnitude
of its consequences. In just the last two decades, republican rot in the states
has directly caused the undemocratic election of dozens of congressmembers

15. The relationship between republicanism and democracy is rich and complex and quite
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to explain here that republican systems of
government help to ensure democratic rule by fostering popular input in and control over
government. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 10, at 115 (stating that “the values of democratic
accountability and majority rule . . . are at the heart of republican government”).
16. See Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate Regular Order, YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
INTER ALIA, 2018, at 1, 1–2.
17. For example, adherence to federal education standards is optional under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the nation’s premier public education law.
See 20 U.S.C. § 7371. The same is true for participation in Medicaid, which operates as a
voluntary federal-state partnership and permits states wide flexibility in determining covered
populations, covered services, health care delivery models, and methods for paying physicians
and hospitals. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which mandates equality in
educational institutions, is similarly an opt-in law tied to the receipt of federal funding for
schools. See id. §§ 1681–1688. Recently, certain localities described as “sanctuary cities”
have refused to cooperate with the federal government’s immigration policies, showing how
even areas of law under complete federal control are reliant on state buy-in. See Colleen Long,
Immigration Agency Subpoenas Sanctuary City Law Enforcement, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan.
15,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/ba19871e3754e9c4c9838bd3b600154e
[https://perma.cc/YNP9-7PD3].
18. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020) (holding states may bind
electors to vote for the candidate the state legislature chooses).
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and a U.S. president.19 On the environment, taxes, health care, gun control,
immigration, reproductive rights, and countless other vital issues, the will of
the majority is flouted by intransigent states suffering republican rot.20
To reform the whole, it is now necessary to reform the parts; to protect
popular interests nationally, it is necessary to improve political institutions
locally. At bottom, big structural policy reforms are not possible without
foundational structural political reforms. This is the constitutional task of
our era.
The republican rot infecting the states is severe. Republican rot describes
corrosion of the two pillars of republican government: popular sovereignty
and equal citizenship.21 These core principles locate all sovereignty in the
people and require political power to be equally distributed amongst them.
Commitment to these principles defines American republicanism and
distinguishes it from the aristocratic forms of government the Constitution
eschews. There are many design variations to republican government, and
American republicanism itself has certainly never fully lived up to both
commitments.
Vast levels of political inequality, oppression, and
disenfranchisement throughout our history reveal both cruel defiance and
myopic miscalculations over exactly which people are sovereign and equal.
But the nation’s irregular or failing commitment to these principles does not
undermine their place as the defining, if aspirational, cornerstones of
republican government.
Yet, increasingly, many states are embracing forms of government that
stray, if not outright flout, these principles. This rotting of equal popular
sovereignty is causing states to abandon republican values and erect
oligarchical power structures that disenfranchise significant portions of their
citizenries. They are proliferating electoral and governing systems designed
to advantage the few and remain unaccountable to the many. Worse, the
decay of equal popular sovereignty is quickening as it feeds off of the divisive
energy of extreme partisan polarization.

19. In 2000, Florida purged thousands of properly registered citizens from its voting roles,
blocking their ability to vote in the U.S. presidential election. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R.,
VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2001), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/exesum.htm [https://
perma.cc/WNH7-MQ5E]. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights estimates that the purge cost
5000 votes for Al Gore. See id. ch. 5. George Bush ultimately won Florida by a margin of 537
votes. David Barstow & Don van Natta Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas
Absentee
Vote,
N.Y. TIMES
(July
15,
2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2001/07/15/us/examining-the-vote-how-bush-took-florida-mining-the-overseas-absenteevote.html [https://perma.cc/46GZ-G92E].
20. See, e.g., ALEX TAUSANOVITCH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING PREVENTS LEGISLATIVE ACTION ON GUN VIOLENCE 4–12 (2019),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2019/12/16110028/GerrymanderingGunC
ontrol-report-4.pdf?_ga=2.84156697.1801728618.1609687404-1575933482.1609000059
[https://perma.cc/3EVB-K8LZ].
21. See infra Part I.C. Professor Jack Balkin describes a similar and broader phenomenon
he terms “constitutional rot.” See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN
HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 19, 19 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018).
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The statistics flagged at the outset of this Article present snapshots of this
unrepublican reality for millions of Americans. Those snapshots describe
only two of many unrepublican practices accelerating the demise of
republicanism across the country: partisan gerrymandering and the
disenfranchisement of individuals with criminal convictions.22 Both of these
practices deny sovereignty to the full polis and privilege an elite class with
outsize political influence over the composition and decisions of government.
Partisan gerrymandering subverts the core tenet of popular sovereignty that
the ruled choose their rulers and devalues the political participation of some
citizens while elevating that of others.
Likewise, criminal
disenfranchisement excludes a significant percentage of the citizenry from
full and equal participation in self-government. These are not the only
badges and incidents of unrepublican rule, but they are two of the more
widespread and egregious.
The Constitution envisioned such a crisis of popular sovereignty and
expressly granted the federal government the authority and the obligation to
act. Consistent with its general approach of protecting rights through power
as opposed to parchment, Article IV, Section 4 bestows a power on the
federal government to ensure republican government in the states.23 It
provides, simply, that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government.”24 It does not grant an
individual right to state republican government per se but rather the federal
means of securing republican government in the states as that concept
evolves.
A republican form of government complies with the bedrock principles of
popular sovereignty and equal citizenship. These criteria are best understood
through contraposition. A “republican form of government” under the
Guarantee Clause is a government that eschews any expression of aristocratic
rule.25 Aristocracy is the contrasting touchstone to republicanism under the
clause. Aristocracy is a hereditarily entrenched, politically imbalanced, and
economically unequal style of government. A state that embraces these
forms of government has abandoned its republican form and opened itself up
to federal intervention under the Guarantee Clause. Practices like partisan
gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement are modern manifestations
22. A third practice that undoubtedly corrupts the relationship between the people and
their rulers by privileging the political power of wealthy individuals and subverting
constituents’ control over and access to their representatives is the level of money in politics.
The current campaign finance regime is, therefore, also a driver of republican rot. However,
unlike other causes of rot, like partisan gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement,
reforming this practice would require an extremely robust exercise of the Guarantee Clause,
such as that discussed in Part III.C, infra, and implicates difficult free speech and democratic
participation questions. For these reasons, it makes practical as well as prudential sense to
begin remediating the republican rot in the states through politically and constitutionally
simpler reforms. That said, the relationship between campaign finance reform and the
Guarantee Clause is fertile ground for further scholarly work.
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
24. Id.
25. See infra Part I.
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of old aristocratic practices: they unequally place power in the hands of the
few and serve to entrench a political class of economic elites. They are
exactly the type of republican rot the Guarantee Clause authorizes Congress
to address.
This Article argues that Congress should exercise its authority under the
Guarantee Clause to pass a sweeping program of republican reforms.
Congress should use all means available to it under the clause to accomplish
this goal: it should legislate against unrepublican practices, create individual
remedies for the denial of political process rights, offer monetary incentives
for states to pass republican reforms, sharpen that incentive by denying
unrepublican state representatives admittance to Congress, and if necessary,
dismantle and reconfigure recalcitrant state governments clasping to severely
unrepublican rule. Such a reform program would include outlawing
unrepublican practices like partisan gerrymandering and incentivizing the
passage of state voter protection and enfranchising laws. It would also
involve incentivizing states to ratify new constitutional amendments
addressing the Electoral College, unequal representation in the Senate, and
an affirmative right to vote and partake equally in democratic processes. In
essence, Congress should embark on a second Reconstruction.
This Article thus bridges two bodies of scholarship: the study of political
process rights and the analysis of the Guarantee Clause. It uses each to fill
gaps in the other. Scholars of political process rights recognize the deep
structural problems with disenfranchisement, entrenchment, and the
anticompetitive lockup of democratic processes.26 They also recognize the
relative inaptitude of courts to remedy these structural deficiencies.27 But
the reforms they advocate are often piecemeal and their analyses are largely
siloed within conventional legal divisions, such as election law, public
corruption, or equal protection law.28 The scholarship has not produced a
grand legislative vision or constitutional strategy for renovating the system.
Guarantee Clause scholarship suffers the opposite infirmity. It has
identified a grand mechanism for reform but would wield it for limited ends
and through ineffective means. This body of scholarship is preoccupied with
the outer limits of what a “republican form of government” might require and
26. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, The
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991); Daryl Levinson
& Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400 (2015); see
also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 357–64 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting some
structural harms that inhere in partisan gerrymandering).
27. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and
the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 504 (2004); Levinson & Sachs, supra note
26, at 417; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283,
293–94 (2014).
28. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 7–10 (2003) (voting rights lens); Gerken,
supra note 27, at 517–18 (election law analysis); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 713
(antitrust framework); Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1698–
99 (1999) (market analysis).
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is fixated on operatizing the clause’s potential through the courts.29 Both
strands of argument are premised on underexamined assumptions. The first
argument assumes that the original anti-aristocracy function of the clause is
anachronistic, and the second argument presumes that courts are the best
constitutional actors for enforcing constitutional rights. Neither is tenable in
the context of the Guarantee Clause. By looking straight past the clause’s
primary function, scholars miss its contemporary utility for reforming state
political practices that impose de facto modern-day aristocratic rule on their
citizens. And by focusing so intently on the clause’s justiciability, scholars
have not paused to consider the federal courts’ relative incompetence to
vindicate structural political rights. Thus, whereas political process theorists
do not recognize violations of structural political rights as aristocratic,
Guarantee Clause scholars do not view the clause’s core anti-aristocracy
function as salient for addressing modern breakdowns in democratic
processes.
This Article stiches these two parallel bodies of study into a cohesive
constitutional strategy for enacting a program of structural political reform.
It resurrects the forgotten function of the Guarantee Clause to prohibit
aristocratic rule, illuminates the salience of this function of the clause in
today’s political landscape, and offers several constitutional paths forward
for Congress to restructure political processes and protect structural rights.
It thus establishes a missing link between theories of constitutional change
and theories of political reform to design a program of federal legislative
intervention to excise republican rot from the states.
In so doing, this Article makes two necessary contributions to the literature
on the Guarantee Clause. First, it resurfaces the main purpose of the clause
as guarding against aristocratic rule in the states and shows how states are
operating in violation of this seminal prohibition today. Specifically, the sum
processes of political entrenchment, voter suppression, and plutocratic
corruption so excessively and unequally depress popular control of
government that they are transforming state governments into modern-day
29. See, e.g., JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 241–42 (2011); WILLIAM WIECEK, THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 287–89 (1972); Akhil Reed Amar, The
Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the
Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 753–54 (1994); Bonfield, supra note 14, at
560; Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 849, 864–69 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–78 (1988); Fred O.
Smith Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 648–
53 (2014); Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause
Regulation of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1749–52 (2010); Jarret A. Zafran,
Comment, Referees of Republicanism: How the Guarantee Clause Can Address State
Political Lockup, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1418, 1446–49 (2016); cf. ELY, supra note 26, at 118;
Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and a New Approach, 60
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 825–27 (2003) (cautioning against justiciability); Richard L.
Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfulfilled: An Argument for the
Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause Cases, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75, 85 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah
& Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (arguing against judicial review of Guarantee Clause legislation).
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aristocracies. Two specific unrepublican practices this Article explores are
partisan gerrymandering and the disenfranchisement of individuals with
criminal convictions.
Second, this Article details for the first time exactly how the Guarantee
Clause may be constitutionally enforced against unrepublican state practices,
without resort to the use of force and occupation that attended the restoration
of republican government during Reconstruction. It provides a sorely
missing defense of the unconventional position that Congress, and not the
U.S. Supreme Court, is the best-suited and most likely institution to exercise
the guarantee power to restore republican government. In the most recent
exposition of the clause, Ryan Williams began to push back on the
overwhelming support for the clause’s justiciability by locating the origins
of the clause in a diplomatic commitment more properly assigned to the
political branches.30 Where his analysis stops, however—and where this
Article in part picks up—is explaining how Congress may constitutionally
fulfill this commitment in a domestic, federalist system. In this way, this
Article opens a more fertile opportunity for examining the substantive
dimensions of a second reconstruction program.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I retraces the core meaning and
historical use of the Guarantee Clause as supplying Congress with the
authority to prevent aristocratic rule in the states, and it explains the specific
features of aristocracy that are antithetical to republican government. The
analysis concludes that political practices that violate the foundational
principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship are fundamentally
aristocratic in nature and are therefore subject to federal intervention under
the Guarantee Clause.
Part II shows that, contrary to widespread assumption, this anti-aristocracy
purpose of the Guarantee Clause is not at all obsolete. In reality, many states
are increasingly adopting aristocratic forms of government through an
interrelated web of voter suppression, entrenchment, and corrupt oligarchical
forms of government. This part examines two such practices—partisan
gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement—as examples of modern
manifestations of aristocratic rule that are ripe for federal intervention under
the Guarantee Clause.
Part III explores, for the first time, exactly how Congress may exercise the
guarantee power. It explains that the clause permits Congress to legislate
directly against unrepublican state practices, incentivize states to adopt
political process reforms under the spending and seating powers, and
dissolve a state government and convene a state constitutional convention.
This part also begins to address the important and diverse limits on

30. Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 611, 679–87
(2018) (investigating the meaning of the clause’s instruction that the United States “guarantee”
a republican form of government and concluding that the power resembles a quasi-diplomatic
commitment adapted from treaty practice, which supports the federal courts’ reluctance to
treat the clause as nonjusticiable).
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Congress’s guarantee power when pursuing each of these enforcement
mechanisms.
Finally, Part IV defends the uncommon position that enforcement of the
guarantee is best left to Congress, not the federal courts. Congress is the
most institutionally competent branch for this task and, as the most politically
self-interested branch, is the most likely to address republican crises, which
present feasible opportunities for politically advantageous reforms. At the
same time, Congress is subject to the most robust internal and external
checks, including constitutional and parliamentary requirements for acting,
executive and judicial overrides, frequent elections, popular opinion, and
mass mobilization. This combination of incentives and limits creates a
default position of inaction coupled with a high likelihood of intervention in
periods of genuine crisis. In contrast to Congress, the federal courts are illequipped to address political process failures and unlikely to act precisely in
moments of crisis. The Supreme Court has underdeveloped doctrinal tools
for protecting structural rights and lacks the institutional design to
legitimately and effectively interfere in state political processes. A
protracted history of poor judicial protection for political process rights,
which this part briefly outlines, simply confirms the Court’s unsuitability for
this task.
Ultimately, this Article reaffirms that the political dysfunction in this
country, while seemingly boundless in scope, is not endless in time. This
current period of intense partisan divide and republican rot echoes the major
cycles of political breakdown and rebuilding of the past.
Prior
reconstructions enabled the federal government to adapt and survive by
ushering in political reforms to its composite parts: the states. These periods
of reconstruction make clear that when norms of democratic governance are
shattered, it becomes necessary to shatter other norms to restore republican
government. This Article provides the blueprint for how.
I. A GUARANTEE AGAINST ARISTOCRACY
The Constitution’s directive that the United States guarantee a
“Republican Form of Government” to every state endows the federal
government with the authority to prevent states from adopting aristocratic
forms of government. This meaning of the clause is uncontroversial.
Scholars of all stripes agree that whatever else the clause might mean, it
clearly empowers the federal government to prevent aristocracy in the
states.31 Though there is ample disagreement as to how far beyond the
31. See WIECEK, supra note 30, at 62–63 (“In the clause’s negative thrust, it was designed
to prohibit monarchical or aristocratic institutions in the states.”); Alexander, supra note 29,
at 773 (“In designing a new governmental structure, the Framers specifically rejected two
forms, monarchy and aristocracy.”); Amar, supra note 29, at 764 (“Republicanism must be
defined as against aristocracy and monarchy.”); Merritt, supra note 29, at 25, 35 n.194 (noting
that the Guarantee Clause plainly restricts the freedom of the states . . . [to] establish a
monarchy, a dictatorship, or any other form of government inconsistent with popular
representation,” that the “original impulse behind the clause might have been a desire to
protect the states from the dangers of aristocratic government,” and that the ultimate adoption
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prevention of monarchy and aristocracy the clause reaches, even the most
prolific defenders of a narrow interpretation of the guarantee power agree it
includes the authority to prevent the adoption of aristocratic forms of
government in the states.32 This meaning inexorably comports with the text
and history of the clause, its common understanding at the founding, the
structure of the Constitution and the federalist system it erects, as well as
evolving standards of constitutional rights and norms.
This overwhelming consensus has worked a sleight of hand, however. The
inconvertibleness of the Guarantee Clause’s anti-aristocracy function has lent
it an aura of inconsequentiality. It is regularly dismissed as archaic and, even
worse, has seduced some scholars into discarding the entire guarantee power
as anachronistic—a relic of another era condemned to constitutional
irrelevance. But it is a mistake to dismiss the clause’s anti-aristocracy
meaning as antiquated or irrelevant. Properly understood, the clause’s antiaristocracy function remains both a supremely potent and pertinent authority.
Aristocracy and republican government are the flip sides of the same coin.
Examining our politics through the lens of aristocracy, however, offers
distinct advantages. First, by focusing on the inverse of republican
government, it is easier to delineate the practices that stray away from it.
Searching for forms of aristocracy in our politics provides a clearer method
of identifying obviously unrepublican state practices. Second, by reading the
clause according to its widely accepted definition, debate over its
contemporary application can move beyond theoretical arguments over the
meaning of “republican government” to concrete analyses of which state
practices run afoul of the guarantee. While the outer-bound definitions of “a
republican form of government” are far from settled, the scholarly focus on
the clause’s possible interpretations has left the settled meaning of the clause
understudied and underappreciated. Of course, the debate may simply shift
to arguments over the meaning of “aristocracy,” but there is less risk of
quagmire in this debate as the historical definition of English “aristocracy”
is narrower and more precise than the phrase “republican form of
government.” The clause’s purpose and ultimately its potential, therefore,
are best fulfilled by returning to its central meaning and applying its dictates
to today’s democratic shortcomings.
This part traces the anti-aristocratic meaning of the clause and relies on its
origins and history, set against republican theory, to drill down on exactly
what an anti-aristocracy guarantee protects against. It first retraces how,
under every primary methodological tool of constitutional interpretation, the
Guarantee Clause bestows on the federal government the power to eliminate
aristocratic forms of government in the states. The plain meaning of the text,
of the “broader language” to secure “republican government” refers to more than just the
danger of “incipient aristocracy”); Williams, supra note 30, at 652 (“Virtually all supporters
of the Constitution who spoke publicly about the provision’s scope insisted that it would
provide a ground for federal intervention only in situations involving the most extreme forms
of deviation from republican principles—meaning the erection of a hereditary monarchy,
despotism, or (perhaps) aristocracy within a state.”).
32. See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 29, at 25.
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now and according to its ordinary public meaning at the time of ratification,
points directly to the clause’s anti-aristocracy meaning; and this textual
interpretation then fully comports with all evidence of the Framers’ intent in
drafting the clause, as well as how the clause was subsequently used by the
Reconstruction Congress generations thereafter. This analysis ultimately
makes clear that a “republican form of government,” when properly
understood as the opposite of an aristocratic form of government, at
minimum, means a government premised on equal, popular sovereignty.
A. The Guarantee Clause’s Anti-aristocracy Origins
In the founding period, both the Framers and the American public broadly
understood the concept of republican government in diametric terms: it was,
simply put, the opposite of monarchy, aristocracy, and despotism.33 These
latter forms of government had a monopoly on the governing structures of
nation-states, and they were the sole points of reference against which
American political philosophies evolved and the Constitution was drafted,
evaluated, and ultimately ratified.
The idea for the Guarantee Clause sprung from James Madison’s
intertwined preoccupations with federal impotence under the Articles of
Confederation to both rebuff foreign interference and to quell domestic
violence in the states. In his April 8, 1787, letter to Virginia governor
Edmund Randolph, which contained the original blueprint for the Virginia
Plan, Madison recognized both the need to “expressly guarantee[] the
tranquillity of the States against internal as well as external dangers” and the
danger “that, unless the Union be organized efficiently on republican
principles, innovations of a much more objectionable form may be
obtruded.”34 Thinking about these two concepts in tandem was common at
the time.35 Drawing from Montesquieu’s observation that a monarchy
established in one state will tend to subvert the freedoms enjoyed in a
neighboring state, the founders viewed the proliferation of monarchical or
aristocratic elements in any state as a security threat to the liberties of the
people of all states.36
The Virginia Plan submitted to the Constitutional Convention fused
responses to these two concerns by proposing an article “[resolving] that a
republican government . . . ought to be guaranteed by the United States to
each state.”37 This clause underwent minor revisions and debate over the
course of the summer, as proxy battles between the small and large states

33. WIECEK, supra note 29, at 17.
34. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 336, 340 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). This letter contained
Madison’s thoughts on necessary reforms and became the basis of the Virginia Plan submitted
to the Constitutional Convention in May 1787. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 29–30.
35. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 29–31.
36. Cf. Williams, supra note 30, at 628–29.
37. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].

2021]

RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS

2169

over other clauses dominated.38 In the wake of the first small-state onslaught
against the Virginia Plan in late June 1787, the clause was reformulated by
Madison and approved by unanimous vote to read: “Resol[ved] . . . ‘That a
Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteid to each
State by the U. States.’”39 A second adopted iteration broke out the twin
purposes of the clause more clearly, resolving that “a Republican form of
Governmt. shall be guarantied to each State & that each State shall be
protected [against] foreign & domestic violence.”40 In the Committee on
Detail, Governor Randolph’s outline for the Constitution’s draft further
teased out the clause’s distinct purposes: “1. to prevent the establishment of
any government, not republican: 2. to protect each state against internal
commotion: and 3. against external invasion.”41 James Wilson restyled the
clause to its current formulation, which was approved with minor changes
and no debate.42 It was placed as the fourth section of the fourth article,
which reads: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when
the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”43
The ratified text quite clearly captures the Framers’ supposed intent.44 It
plainly establishes a source of federal authority to protect against aristocratic
usurpations of state government. The clause obligates the United States to
“Guarantee” to each state a “Republican Form of Government.” The verb
guarantee, as customarily used in treaty practice at the time, signifies an
obligation and authority for one sovereign to intervene and enforce a
preestablished right existing between two other sovereign entities—here, the
states and the sovereign people of those states.45 The word “form” relates to
the structure of government, which concerns where power resides and how it
is exercised. A republican form of government is one that is comprised of
representatives drawn from and accountable to the public, as opposed to an
aristocratic form, which is comprised of nobles dependent on hereditary lines
of power.46 To be sure, the word “form,” as used here, is not so synonymous
with structure to the point it eschews any concern for substance; rather,
“form” would have been understood to mean “kind” or “sort,” indicating that

38. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 52–54.
39. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 37, at 47.
40. Id. at 48–49.
41. 4 id. at 49.
42. See 2 id. at 459, 578, 621.
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
44. That is, their self-articulated intent as can best be gleaned from the historical record
available. See infra notes 106–23, 134–35 and accompanying text.
45. Williams, supra note 30, at 615–20.
46. See Fred O. Smith Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant: Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1955–56 (2012).
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the clause guarantees a republican system of government whose function and
output align with republican principles.47
The clause’s placement in Article IV, Section 4, alongside clauses
protecting against invasion and domestic violence, further underscores its
central purpose of preventing aristocratic rule in the states. Section 4 is, in
every way, aimed at protecting against aristocratic usurpation. The foreign
nations presenting a threat of invasion at the time were all monarchical
aristocracies. Additionally, the founders deeply believed that internal
insurrection invariably led to anarchy, counterinsurgency, or military coup—
all of which generated fertile grounds for the installment of a monarch and
ruling class.48
More broadly, Article IV is devoted to intrastate relations and is the only
place in the 1788 Constitution that delineates rights individuals hold against
the states. The first two sections contain the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause—all of
which order individuals’ relationships to the states. A guarantee of
republican government similarly protects the political process rights of
individuals in each state and directs an important element of intrastate
relations by foreclosing the threat of an aristocratic coup migrating across
state lines.49
The historical evolution and use of the clause paint a similarly
incontrovertible picture of a power intended to thwart and undo aristocratic
innovations in the states. Though its place in constitutional history is
relatively small—having been sidelined by lack of enforcement and the
adoption of other civil and political constitutional rights—it is anything but
insignificant.
To begin, it played some role in ratifying the Constitution, with proponents
of ratification invariably describing the clause in anti-aristocracy terms.
Such a description would have appealed to skeptics on both sides by ensuring
that the proposed Constitution was both sufficiently rights protective, despite
lacking a bill of rights, and sufficiently federalist in limiting federal
intervention to preventing aristocracy.50 James Iredell explained to the North
Carolina ratifying convention that the clause would empower the federal
government to guarantee “that no state should have a right to establish an
aristocracy or monarchy.”51 In newspapers, advocates identified the clause’s
47. See Bonfield, supra note 14, at 530 (arguing that founding-era courts would have
understood “form” to mean “kind” or “sort,” based on the purpose of Article IV, Section 4
and existing definitions of the word).
48. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 95–96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003)
(“A guarantee by the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of
rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.”); see
also WIECEK, supra note 29, at 49; White, supra note 14, at 797–98.
49. See Amar, supra note 29, at 765.
50. See Williams, supra note 30, at 652–53, 652 n.308 (noting anti-Federalist concerns
with the potential for federal intervention under the clause).
51. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 195 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed.
1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
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central function as ensuring that state constitutions “cannot be royal forms,
cannot be aristocratical, but must be republican.”52 Essays, including The
Federalist Papers, assured the public that the clause was a source of federal
protection for states “against monarchical or aristocratical encroachments”53
and a necessary power in “a confederacy founded on republican principles,
and composed of republican members . . . to defend the system against
aristocratic or monarchial innovations.”54
After ratification, the clause was periodically invoked in the early and midnineteenth century as two deeply unrepublican failings came under
increasing scrutiny. The first was the severe and violent political subjugation
of poor laborers.55 This type of political inequality prompted national
attention on the Guarantee Clause, for the first time, in the 1840s, when small
property owners in Rhode Island revolted in response to extreme
malapportionment and disenfranchisement in an episode known as Dorr’s
Rebellion, which led both President John Tyler and the Supreme Court to
consider (and decline) federal interference in settling the dispute under the
Guarantee Clause.56 The second unrepublican failing was the even more
severe and violent subjugation of enslaved human beings. But though the
clause was tailor-made to redress both failings, a fractured and reticent
federal government on the brink of collapse did not muster the political
capital to enforce the guarantee until the government did collapse, and all the
reasons for inaction turned into reasons for intervention.
B. The Reconstruction of Slave Aristocracies
The guarantee power has been used in earnest only once. It formed the
constitutional basis for Congress’s reconstruction of the South after the Civil
War, and indeed, its reconstruction of the entire federalist system. It is
largely understood that the Guarantee Clause justified this program because
chattel slavery is deeply incompatible with basic republican values. But that
is not the full story. The Guarantee Clause was such a natural fit for
reconstructing the South because the task involved more than abolishing
slavery. It required dismantling and replacing an entire political slave

52. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen: An Examination of the Constitution of the United
States (pt. 3), INDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 29, 1788, reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION:
WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 1787–1788, at 466, 470 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary
L. McDowell eds., 1998).
53. Plain Truth, Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP. GAZETTEER,
Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 216, 218 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 48, at 211 (James Madison).
55. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 371 (2005); Amar,
supra note 29, at 778. See generally WIECEK, supra note 29, at 78–110 (discussing the
clause’s invocations in Shays’s Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, Dorr’s Rebellion, and the
“Bleeding Kansas” civil war).
56. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 40 (1849). For additional discussion of this
episode and how it informs the modern applicability of the Guarantee Clause to partisan
gerrymandering, see infra Part II.A.
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economy, a task on all fours with the core purpose of the clause to expel
aristocratic forms of government in the states.
American slavery was many horrendous things; and one of these things
was a network of slave aristocracies. Aristocracy is a form of government in
which power is held by a class of noble citizens, whose membership in that
class entitles them to hereditary rights of power and property. It is
government by the “well-born” and generally describes a political economy
in which the noble and common classes are bonded in property relationships.
In particular, an aristocracy’s nobility has rights to the economic output of
nonnoble citizens, who are entitled to fewer social and political rights than
their rulers.
So too in the American slave states. Slave governments embraced a form
of government in which power was held by a class of white nobility, whose
membership in this hereditary, racial caste entitled them to rights and powers
under law that were denied slaves and racial minorities. It was government
by the “well-born,” as slave and master status were determined by birth. And
it comprised a political economy defined by property relationships between
human beings of different hereditary castes, where white masters were
legally entitled to all the economic output of their Black slaves—even their
children—while slaves had virtually no social, political, or legal rights of
their own. If anything, slavery was racial aristocracy on steroids.
Abolitionists began making the connection between slavery and
republicanism in the late 1830s, invoking the Guarantee Clause with
increasing frequency for the argument that slavery, as an institution, is
incompatible with republican government. In particular, these antislavery
advocates began formulating a theory of abolition based on the principle of
popular sovereignty, arguing that slavery eviscerated this necessary pillar of
republican government in states with a majority or near-majority slave
population.57
Theoretical arguments for the abolition of slavery ultimately gave way to
the practical realities of war. By spring 1861, eleven states had seceded from
the Union, kicking off a yearslong humanitarian and constitutional crisis.58
As war pushed Unionists first to accept and then to demand abolition, federal
officials endeavored to make constitutional sense of secession and to plan for
eventual reconciliation and reconstruction.59
The Guarantee Clause quickly emerged as pivotal to both these projects.
First, a “state suicide” theory of secession relied on the Guarantee Clause to
explain how the divided nation nonetheless remained an indivisible Union,
positing that secession effectively killed the constitutional relationship
between the rebel state governments and the Union, leaving those states with
a constitutionally unrecognizable—and therefore unrepublican—form of
government, exactly what Article IV had anticipated and provided a remedy

57. WIECEK, supra note 29, at 156–62.
58. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 354–55.
59. See id. at 355.
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for.60 Second, forward-looking U.S. senators turned to the Guarantee Clause
early on in the war effort to envision a concrete plan for postwar
reconstruction.61 Two competing perspectives emerged. Senator Ira Harris,
a conservative Republican, proposed empowering the president to establish
provisional governments in the rebel states until loyal state governments
could be organized through new constitutional conventions.62 Senator
Charles Sumner, a progressive Republican and staunch abolitionist,
advocated that the federal government administer the rebel states while new
governments were convened and that Congress evaluate the new states’
constitutions and governments for their republican character.63
Four momentous years—the loss of nearly three-quarters of a million
Americans,64 the emancipation of slaves, and the reelection and assassination
of President Abraham Lincoln—left the aristocratic plantation system of the
South in ashes. By the summer of 1865, the last Confederate troops had
surrendered and the ex-rebel states convened state constitutional
conventions, ratified new state constitutions that repudiated slavery and
secession, and elected new state legislatures.65 But on December 4, 1865,
the Thirty-Ninth Congress, convening for the first time, refused to seat any
of the representatives from the eleven former Confederate states on the basis
that no legal state governments yet existed in these states because of their
continued embrace of a political slave aristocracy, including the
disenfranchisement of their now free Black citizens.66 Whereas President
Andrew Johnson was content with a strategy of appeasement and transition,
congressional Republicans were committed not just to peace and rebuilding
but also to dismantling in earnest the former slave aristocracies of the South
and reconfiguring the relationship between the Union, the states, and the
people.67
The task of developing this grand strategy fell to the newly created Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, which issued its report the following
summer.68 The committee labored in a politically fraught environment, as
simmering tensions between the Republican-led Congress and President
Johnson erupted into all-out blows over the passage of the Civil Rights Act

60. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 176.
61. See id. at 179–85.
62. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3139–42 (1862) (statement of Sen. Ira Harris);
see WIECEK, supra note 29, at 179–80.
63. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 736–37, 3139 (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner); WIECEK, supra note 29, at 175–77, 181. For a more detailed history of how the
Guarantee Clause was utilized by the Republicans in the lead-up to Reconstruction, see id. at
166–94.
64. See J. David Hacker, A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead, 57 CIV. WAR
HIST. 307, 307 (2011).
65. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 100–01 (1998).
66. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 366.
67. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 19–20.
68. JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
RECONSTRUCTION (1866).
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of 186669 and the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act,70 both of which Johnson
vetoed and Congress eventually overrode to pass into law. The committee’s
report presented Congress a prime opportunity to expand its arsenal in the
fight against President Johnson’s and the Southern states’ push for a speedy
readmission and a return to the states’ rights model of federalism.71 The final
report was unequivocal and comprehensive. It essentially adopted Senator
Sumner’s proposed constitutional architecture for Reconstruction: it
embraced a robust view of the guarantee power, accepted that republican
government is impossible where a large minority of the adult male population
is disenfranchised, and claimed for Congress primary responsibility to
govern Reconstruction.72
Operating under this framework, Congress set to work transforming the
Southern governments from slave aristocracies into republics founded on the
twin principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship. Its first inroad
was proposing ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment73 in June 1866,74
which advanced both goals by redefining who was included in the class of
“sovereign people” (“all persons born or naturalized in the United States”75)
and conferring equal legal and political rights on every citizen within that
class.76 But in the wake of continued Southern intransigence and landslide
Republican victories in the November 1866 congressional elections,
Congress launched an unprecedentedly forceful and intrusive campaign to
reform state governments under the Guarantee Clause.77
The centerpiece of Congress’s campaign to establish republican forms of
government in the former Confederate states was the First Reconstruction
Act of 1867.78 The Act declared that no legal state governments or adequate
protections for life and property existed in ten Confederate states, divided
these states into five military districts, imposed federal military rule until new
governments could be formed, empowered the army to compile new voter
registries that included the male former slaves, and directed the Army to
convene new state constitutional conventions.79 Under these procedures,
nearly three-quarters of a million former slaves registered to vote.80 The Act
also established the conditions for readmission: each state was required to

69. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
70. Ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
71. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 189–91.
72. JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 68, at xiii, xviii–xxi.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
74. JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 68, at vi.
75. Id.
76. See id. at xiii.
77. See id. at xvi; 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 296 (Richard Zuczek
ed., 2006).
78. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
79. The process for registering new voters, holding the state conventions, and adopting
new state constitutions was further outlined in the Second Reconstruction Act of 1867, passed
March 23, 1867. See Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2.
80. See KEVEN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43626, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF
1965: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 4 (2015).

2021]

RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS

2175

adopt a new state constitution, under which the people would elect a new
state legislature, which was required to pass the Fourteenth Amendment.81
Reconstruction under this formula took a little over a year. In the summer
of 1868, Congress determined that seven of the excluded states had
satisfactorily renounced their slave aristocracies and adopted republican
forms of government.82 It was through these states’ compliance with the
imposed conditions for readmission that the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in July 1868.83 When one of these readmitted states, Georgia, then
expelled all of its duly elected Black state representatives and seated
nonjuring ex-Confederates in its state legislature, Congress reimposed
federal military rule and rerevoked the admission of Georgia’s congressional
delegation.84 It was not until 1870 that Congress passed a bill for the
reconstruction of Georgia, which mirrored the First Reconstruction Act and
required passage of the now pending Fifteenth Amendment85 as an additional
The remaining three states—Virginia,
condition of readmission.86
Mississippi, and Texas87—were also obliged to ratify the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments as a condition of readmission.88 They did so in the
early months of 1870 and were promptly readmitted to Congress.89 Virginia,
Mississippi, and Georgia’s ratifications were among the twenty-eight state
ratifications necessary for the Fifteenth Amendment to become law.
C. The Anti-aristocracy Guarantee Power
Several conclusions about the meaning of the guarantee power are gleaned
by reading its text, origins, and historical use in light of its undisputed
function as a tool for eradicating aristocracy in the states. In particular, its
anti-aristocracy function makes clear the clause bestows a prophylactic
legislative power designed to usher in new legal paradigms of political rights.
First, the considered decision by the Framers to independently guarantee
republican government separate and apart from guaranteeing protection
against foreign invasion and domestic violence indicates the guarantee power
is prophylactic. The Guarantee Clause must apply to a state that peaceably
devolves into aristocracy or monarchy because the foreign invasion and
domestic violence clauses already cover the violent overthrow of republican
government. A state that peaceably abandons republican government likely
does so incrementally. Fulfilling the guarantee in the context of incremental
81. See id.
82. See id. at 5. They were Arkansas (June 22, 1868), Florida (June 25, 1868), North
Carolina (July 4, 1868), Louisiana (July 9, 1868), South Carolina (July 9, 1868), Alabama
(July 13, 1868), and Georgia (July 21, 1868). 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA,
supra note 77, at 833–35.
83. COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 4.
84. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 217–20.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
86. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 219–20.
87. AMAR, supra note 55, at 397.
88. COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 5; Bonfield, supra note 14, at 541.
89. Georgia was not readmitted until July 15, 1870. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION ERA, supra note 77, at 833.
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decline would require federal intervention at a point short of the state
devolving into full aristocracy. Moreover, the clause is a positive pledge of
a republican form of government, as opposed to a negative guarantee against
aristocracy. The choice is striking given that the other two obligations
imposed on the United States in the same clause are to protect against
invasion and domestic violence. The same negative guarantee in the context
of protecting republican government would tether federal intervention to the
realization of a full aristocracy or monarchy in a state. The text takes the
opposite tack.
Second, the anti-aristocracy meaning of the clause confirms a primary role
for Congress in exercising the guarantee power. The power to interfere in
peaceable state political processes is most properly exercised by a legislative
branch. The Constitution consistently approves this allocation of power by
granting Congress authority over intrastate relations, including in the other
provisions of Article IV.90 At the same time, as Ryan Williams explains at
length, by empowering the United States to “guarantee” republican
government, the clause permits the use of force to ensure state compliance
with republican principles.91 Authorizing the use of force, particularly in the
domestic context, is a power allocated to Congress in the first instance.92
Third, viewing the clause as an anti-aristocracy bulwark sheds new light
on the evolving character of its meaning. The Framers’ deliberate rejection
of proposals to guarantee each state’s “territory,” “constitution,” or “laws,”
indicates the clause does not guarantee states’ original structures of
government but rather adopts a dynamic conception of republicanism that
progresses as society evolves. The Supreme Court’s earliest case law shores
up this understanding of the clause, as it continuously linked principles of
republicanism to natural law, which by definition is an evolving standard.93
But ultimately, it was Reconstruction that resoundingly solidified this
interpretation of the clause.
War, congressional action, popular
reaffirmation, and judicial and executive acquiescence all gave fuller
definition to the meaning of republican government and thereby confirmed
the evolving nature of that guarantee. By branding the South’s political slave
economy as fundamentally unrepublican in 1865, this generation of
Americans confirmed that the constitutional line between a republican and
unrepublican form of government is not static but evolves as society

1.

90. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); id. art. IV, § 1; id. § 3, cl.

91. Williams, supra note 30, at 615.
92. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16 (covering Congress’s powers to declare war, to
raise armies, to maintain a navy, and to call forth the militia).
93. See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (linking republican
government and the “spirit and the letter of the constitution” to “the principles of natural
justice”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143–44 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring)
(observing that republicanism is dictated by natural justice); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 387–89 (1798) (noting that states, as republican governments, are bound by natural
justice); Bonfield, supra note 14, at 558–59 (articulating how the concept of republicanism
was principally informed by natural justice, which inherently is an evolving concept like the
common law).

2021]

RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS

2177

progresses and gives truer meaning to the principles of popular sovereignty
and equal citizenship. In the same vein, this history settled that the
“sovereign people” entitled to republican government under the clause is a
term defined according to contemporary democratic norms.94
Finally, this analysis further elucidates that the proper target of the
guarantee power is aristocratic structures and political processes. The text
guarantees a republican form of government. The emphasis here on
governmental structure indicates a preoccupation with preserving political
process rights—the right and ability to participate in self-government. And
though the Framers ultimately rejected the language of guaranteeing each
state a “republican constitution,” their repeated description of the clause as
having this effect emphasizes the focus on preserving structural rights. The
Reconstruction generation reaffirmed this understanding of the clause’s
focus by using it primarily to undo structures of power and to protect the
political process from being corrupted by sedition or unequal representation.
In so doing, the guarantee power, both in substance and in deed, redefined
the structural relationship between the federal government and the states.
The clause’s structural focus and historical use also highlight its place as
an enforcement power rather than an individual right. The Reconstruction
Congress used the Guarantee Clause as the legal mechanism for imposing a
program of reconstruction on the states; the social and political reforms that
program aimed to accomplish were sought entirely through the passage of
new substantive law, including new constitutional law through the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In other words, the guarantee power
may reconstitute the law but does not itself supply any legal requirements.
The difference is significant because Congress’s guarantee power is
inherently temporal, linked to the extent and duration of a state’s
nonconformity with a republican form of government. Substantive law, on
the other hand—and especially constitutional law—operates in perpetuity
until overridden or otherwise negated. The Guarantee Clause was operative
so long as the Southern states remained unrepublican, but much of the law it
ushered through remains operative to this day.
The clause’s uncontroversial anti-aristocracy function thus helps bring out
the less obvious features of the guarantee power. In sum, the text, structure,
history, and evolution of the clause confirm that it confers authority on the
federal government to prevent aristocratic forms of government from
94. Women were ultimately denied equal political rights in this reformist era in apparent
accord with contemporary democratic norms. The hypocrisy did not go unnoticed and was
vigorously challenged by women’s rights activists. The resounding incompleteness of the
Reconstructionists’ republican reforms, however, does not undermine the use of the Guarantee
Clause to correct another egregious violation of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship in
the states, namely the denial of equal rights on account of race. For compelling histories of
the failure to correct the separate unrepublican denial of women’s political rights during
Reconstruction, see generally BERNADETTE CAHILL, NO VOTE FOR WOMEN: THE DENIAL OF
SUFFRAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (2019); FAYE E. DUDDEN, FIGHTING CHANCE: THE
STRUGGLE OVER WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND BLACK SUFFRAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA
(2011); LAURA E. FREE, SUFFRAGE RECONSTRUCTED: GENDER, RACE, AND VOTING RIGHTS IN
THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2015).
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supplanting the representative relationship between the people and the state
and to eradicate any such forms that take hold. To this end, it inevitably
bestows a prophylactic power on Congress to protect an evolving
understanding of structural political rights.
D. Distinguishing Between Aristocratic and Republican Government
Having elucidated the Guarantee Clause’s broad protection against
evolving manifestations of aristocratic rule, the salient features of republican
government that the clause requires the United States to guarantee are now
brought into sharper relief. American republicanism evolved in direct
contraposition to English aristocracy. It is therefore possible to trace the line
between these two forms of government by looking to their points of
departure. At its most basic level, the Constitution adopted two core
innovations from the English system: it locates all sovereignty in the people
and distributes power equally among them.95 These two principles—popular
sovereignty and equal citizenship—are what differentiate a republic from an
aristocracy in constitutional terms. A state in violation of either principle
takes on an aristocratic form and opens itself to federal intervention under
the Guarantee Clause.
Popular sovereignty describes a system of self-rule in which government
derives all its power from the people. A popular sovereign government is
one operating with the consent of the people, formed of the people, and
alterable by a majority of the people. It differs starkly from aristocratic rule,
which is premised on power residing perpetually in a small and elite subset
of the people through heredity. Equal citizenship is the second cornerstone
of republican government and refers to the equal distribution of political
power among the sovereign public. In a republic, no one person or class of
people has a greater or lesser claim to political power. By contrast, political
power is unevenly distributed in an aristocracy, which entitles a propertied
nobility to a greater share of the governing authority.96
Exactly which people constitute these sovereign and equal citizens has
been the central struggle of republican progress. By excluding women and
slaves from the franchise, for example, the founding generation adopted an
imperfect and quite incomplete republic. A republic need not locate all
sovereignty equally in all people, but it must at least locate equal sovereignty
in those populations capable of self-government and civic participation.
Determining who is so capable involves a calculus the nation has repeatedly
botched. Many generations, either cruelly or myopically, long considered
women and slaves unfit for civic participation. This error sowed the seeds of
war, suffering, and ultimately reform, as society progressed and it became

95. See White, supra note 14, at 794 (explaining how, in establishing the Constitution,
Americans relocated sovereignty from the king to the people and built into the essence of
government the principle of representativeness).
96. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476 (1793) (stating that republican
government requires equality of popular sovereignty).
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clear that denying these populations equal participation in government was
indeed fundamentally unrepublican.
This calculus was so glaringly wrong by contemporary standards that it is
hard to describe American democracy as republican at all. But while we
rightly fault past generations for erring in their calculus and maintaining a
halting commitment to republicanism, it is critical to understand that this
was, and still is, the accepted formula for republican government. Today, we
regularly exclude children, noncitizen residents, the severely mentally
incapacitated, and many with criminal convictions from the franchise based
on this metric—that in one way or another these populations are unqualified
participants in self-government. It is quite possible our current calculus is
wrong, and I will argue below that for at least one of these populations, it is.
But whether the founding generation, or indeed contemporary society, has
succeeded in creating a genuine republic that fully lives up to the principles
of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship is a separate question from what
republican government requires and thus, what the Guarantee Clause
empowers the federal government to require of the states.
Even as the Constitution was put into effect by an unrepublican republic,
it is clear from the document and the political philosophy undergirding its
words that the republican form of government it envisions and demands of
the states is one in which all power is derived from, and distributed equally
amongst, the people. These are the central tenets of republican political
theory, which supplies the philosophical foundations for the system of
government established by the Constitution.97
Republicanism is a political theory that places both sovereignty and
governing authority in the hands of the people. From its origins in classical
Greek and Roman societies, the principle novelty republicanism introduced
was enlarging the definition of “the people” to include nonnoble
professionals. The term derives from the Latin res publica, the thing of the
people, and continued to be defined in founding-era dictionaries as “placing
the government in the people.”98 At its core, it is a philosophy of government
that emphasizes the political participation of citizens for the good of the
whole. The Framers were united in their commitment to establishing a
97. There is widespread scholarly agreement that a republican government requires
popular rule by a politically equal citizenry. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 29, at 778
(“[W]hile scholars offer different perspectives and pursue different agendas, popular
sovereignty is consistently believed to be at the core of the republican form of government.”);
Amar, supra note 29, at 749 (stating republican government requires “that the structure of
day-to-day government—the Constitution—be derived from ‘the People’ and be legally
alterable by a ‘majority’ of them”); Merritt, supra note 29, at 23 (“[W]idespread agreement
exists among scholars and jurists about the core meaning of republican government . . . . [as]
one in which the people control their rulers.”); Smith, supra note 46, at 1954 (“There is broad
consensus that as a textual matter, ‘republican’ refers at a minimum to popular sovereignty
and the principle of majority rule.”); Zafran, supra note 29, at 1445 (“For all the different
conceptions of the Clause’s text, origins, and contemporary meaning, virtually all agree that
popular control remains central to its guarantee.”).
98. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. F. & C.
Rivington 6th ed. 1785).
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republic, even as they adhered to and fused different strands of republican
theory to guide them in structuring a republic that could succeed in a diverse
and geographically expansive nation.99 The hallmark of such a republic was
necessarily the process of democratic representation.100 The two core
principles indispensable to representativeness, and thus to American
republicanism, are popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.101
One need look no further than the “two great title-deeds of the Republic,
the Declaration of Independence and the National Constitution,”102 to
understand how popular sovereignty and equal citizenship define republican
government in the United States. The Declaration rests its argument for
independence on these two precise principles by pronouncing “first, that all
men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that just government stands only on
the consent of the governed.”103 The Constitution establishes a federal
republican system by robustly incorporating the principles of popular
sovereignty and equal citizenship at multiple levels. First, the document
creates overlapping structural mechanisms for ensuring that the government
reflects the contemporary and composite will of the people. It establishes
multiple branches of government, each elected in different ways, by different
constituencies, at different times, and pursuant to rules established by
different bodies.104 It then creates an extraordinarily low floor, by
eighteenth-century standards, for participating in the franchise and for
holding office, expanding the franchise to a much higher proportion of
citizens than could vote in England.105 The absence of any property
requirement for holding office, in particular, significantly widened
membership eligibility as compared to England, where even membership in

99. See Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550, 1558–
64 (1988). As Sunstein notes, even individually, many of the founders likely embraced and
drew on commitments to both pluralist and republican thought. See id. Compare THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 48 (James Madison) (pluralist analysis), with THE FEDERALIST
NO. 39, supra note 48 (James Madison) (republican lens).
100. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at
164–65, 596–600 (1998) (underscoring the central principle of representativeness in
republican theory); see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 161–75 (1967) (same).
101. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1552. Sunstein writes that republicanism is characterized
by a commitment to four principles: popular sovereignty (“citizenship,” in his terms),
“equality of political actors,” deliberation, and universalism (agreement as the governing
ideal). See id. at 1539, 1541. Together, these four principles comprise the foundational aspects
of a representative system, i.e., a deliberative system, where majoritarian agreement governs,
founded on the popular sovereignty and equality of political actors.
102. Senator Charles Sumner, Admission of Mississippi to Representation in Congress:
Speech in the Senate (Feb. 17, 1870), reprinted in 13 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 331,
333 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1880).
103. Id.
104. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 38. This scheme aims to enhance legislative
representativeness. In John Adams’s words, a republican legislature “should be in miniature
an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.” JOHN
ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT 195 (Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1776).
105. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 13–17.
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the House of Commons was limited to men of vast estates.106 To further
disentangle power from the aristocratic pillars of wealth and heredity, the
Constitution prohibits titles of nobility, makes no distinction of birth,107
eschews the traditional model of apportioning the upper legislative chamber
by wealth, and bestows a salary on government members so that common
citizens can afford to hold office, in stark contrast to the rule in England that
members of Parliament serve without pay.108
The few qualifications the Constitution does impose on membership—
residency, age, and citizenship—were themselves designed to advance the
principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.109 A residency
requirement guarded against wealthy men from neighboring states seeking
election after losing in their own states, as was the practice in England.110
An age requirement limited the risk that young men from wealthy and famous
families would crowd out more representative members of the community
from obtaining office.111 The Constitution makes this short list of
qualifications exclusive to preclude cunning politicians from manipulating
membership qualifications to diminish or distort the wide stock of eligible
citizens for office.112 In the end, not just the lower legislative chamber but
the entire federal government was designed to be “open to merit of every
description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without
regard to property or wealth, or to any particular profession or religious
faith.”113
Finally, the Reconstruction Amendments fill out the meaning of
constitutional republicanism and confirm the primacy of popular sovereignty
and equal citizenship in this form of government. As discussed, the architects
of the Reconstruction Amendments crafted those provisions to establish

106. See generally WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:
REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY
ERA 315–27 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield rev. ed. 2001) (1973);
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 264 (1988).
107. With the glaring exception of sanctioning the hereditary institution of slavery.
108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 9; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. III, § 1. There was
disagreement at the founding whether all property qualifications were strictly incompatible
with republican government. Some state constitutions organized their upper bicameral
chamber by wealth, and Federalist No. 39 referred to England’s House of Commons as a
“republican branch” within a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy. However, at the
Constitutional Convention, specific and frequent proposals for a property qualification for
membership in the Senate, for Senate positions to be unpaid, and for a property requirement
to vote were advanced, considered, and ultimately rejected. As a result, this feature of
government lost its republican compatibility through the constitution-making process. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 48, at 182 (James Madison); Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at
868.
109. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 68–70.
110. See id. at 70.
111. See id. at 70–71.
112. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783, 808–09 (1995); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522, 535 (1969).
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 48, at 256 (James Madison).
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republican government in the ex-Confederate states.114 At their core, these
amendments deal almost exclusively with achieving greater popular
sovereignty and establishing political equality amongst the newly configured
citizenry. By abolishing slavery, granting citizenship and expanding the
franchise to the freed slaves, and restricting from membership in government
certain public officials who engaged in rebellion, the Reconstruction
Amendments recalculated the definition of the “sovereign people” to bring it
into conformity with contemporary notions of republican civic virtue. Then,
by guaranteeing the equal right to vote, the abolition of all badges and
incidents of slavery, and the equal protection of the laws, the Reconstruction
Amendments established the conditions for the newly freed slaves to enjoy
political equality.115
In all these ways, the Constitution reflects that the central pillars of the
republican government it establishes are popular sovereignty and equal
citizenship. It does not “favor[] the elevation of the few on the ruins of the
many” but is instead “scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of
every class and description of citizens.”116 It is formed by a body of
politically equal citizens—“not the rich more than the poor; not the learned
more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune . . . . [but by] the
great body of the people of the United States.”117 And it is governed by the
same—by “every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and
confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious
faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint
the inclination of the people.”118 In short, it is structured as a government of,
by, and for equally sovereign citizens.119
During ratification, Madison heralded the synthesis of popular sovereignty
and equal citizenship as “the genius of Republican liberty” in the United
States.120 He elaborated on their interconnection, writing in Federalist No.
39, “It is ESSENTIAL to [a republican] government, that it be derived from
the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a
favored class of it . . . .”121 Roger Sherman described republican government
similarly in a letter to John Adams, explaining that “what especially
114. See supra Part I.B.
115. See Smith, supra note 29, at 639 (collecting quotes linking amendments to
republicanism).
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 48, at 277–78 (James Madison).
117. Id. at 278.
118. Id.
119. This is not to suggest that the Constitution is not elitist, only that it is not aristocratic.
The Constitution contains a number of explicitly elitist forms, from the legislative selection of
senators, to the Electoral College. These choices reflected a desire to populate the government
with educated men of a certain stature in society. But creating incidental advantages for
political elites is not the same as privileging a favored class with unequal political power. That
said, to the extent these constitutional structures run afoul of contemporary notions of popular
sovereignty and equal citizenship, they are fair targets for reform under the Guarantee Clause.
See infra Part III.C.
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 48, at 170 (James Madison).
121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 48, at 182 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
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denominates [a government] a republic is its dependence on the public or
people at large, without any hereditary powers.”122 Nearly a century later,
congressmen attempting to reconstruct Southern slave states into republics
would identify “liberty, equality before the law, and the consent of the
governed [as the] essential elements of a republican government.”123
Accordingly, these two core attributes of republican government are not
only foundational, they are definitional. Every other viable model of national
government to the Framers—of which there were two, monarchy and
aristocracy—broke with these two principles.124 Popular sovereignty and
equal citizenship, therefore, describe the meaning of republicanism in as
much as they define how republicanism differs from aristocracy. They are
the distinguishing factors between the two systems of government.
A republic that ceases to adhere to the principles of popular sovereignty
and equal citizenship devolves back into an aristocratic form of
government—and it is precisely these forms of government that the
Guarantee Clause prohibits. Put differently, state political processes that
interfere with popular rule or that favor one political class over another
amount to aristocratic regressions of the type Congress may proscribe under
the Guarantee Clause. Specifically, political processes that strip away
majority popular control over government in favor of exclusive or entrenched
control violate the principle of popular sovereignty and cross the line from
republican to aristocratic. Similarly, political processes that permit wealthy
elites a greater share of governing power violate the republican principle of
equal citizenship and are fundamentally aristocratic.125
One caveat is necessary here: there may be other indispensable elements
of a republican form of government that are not explicitly anti-aristocratic or
that could easily exist in an aristocratic government. Such elements might
include guarantees of due process, transparency, and some separation

122. Letter from Roger Sherman to John Adams (July 20, 1789), in CHARLES FRANCIS
ADAMS, WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 4, 437 (Boston, Cambridge Press 1851).
123. Letter from Charles Sumner to Francis Lieber (Oct. 12, 1864), in 4 EDWARD L. PIERCE,
MEMOIR AND LETTERS OF CHARLES SUMNER 258, 259 (Boston, Roberts Bros. 1894).
124. Naturally, myriad other forms of government existed and flourished throughout the
world, particularly indigenous governments, non-European governments, and European citystates. The available models for independent, national governments were quite limited,
though. Even the Dutch Republic, ostensibly another national republican system, operated as
a confederation and was functionally ruled by a closed, oligarchical “regent” class and a
hereditary sovereign (the Stadtholder, Prince of Orange). See Catherine Secretane, “True
Freedom” and the Dutch Tradition of Republicanism, REPUBLICS OF LETTERS, Dec. 2010, at
82, 84.
125. It bears repeating that this is not to say that popular sovereignty and equal citizenship
have always entailed full participation in political power. There has been a constant struggle
in this country over who counts in the popular citizenship denominator. Questions of which
people are sovereign and enjoy equal citizenship have driven the country to war and to
revolution. Though full popular sovereignty and full equal citizenship were not contemplated
by the founders and indeed have not been embraced to this day, the political principles of
popular sovereignty and equal citizenship were then, and remain now, the central defining
pillars of a republican form of government.
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between the executive, legislative, judicial, and military powers.126 Should
a state discard these precepts, it would run afoul of the Guarantee Clause,
though it would not necessarily have devolved into an aristocracy. These
two forms of government, aristocracy and republic, are not polar opposites,
despite the founders’ dichotic understanding of the two. Rather, they are
successive models in a lineage of political development. While the
Guarantee Clause may also prohibit departures from other foundational
principles of republican government, the point here is only to recall that the
clause surely and unequivocally bars states from imposing aristocratic rule
on their citizens—and that, properly understood, this function is not at all
obsolete. Our greatest democratic failures as a nation have violated one or
both of the core principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.
Scholarly debate over what more the clause could stand to mean is, therefore,
a bit of a distraction. The clause’s anti-aristocracy meaning is, and always
has been, up to the task the nation needs it for.
II. THE ARISTOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS OF SEVERAL STATES
Scholars wrongly assume that the threat of aristocratic encroachment that
prompted the drafting of the Guarantee Clause became largely anachronistic
soon after the founding.127 This was not true by Reconstruction and it is not
true today. Aristocratic innovations are again clogging up the machineries
of representative democracy in many states. The problems of political
entrenchment and the anticompetitive lockup of the political markets by
incumbent powers, voter suppression, and the corruptive influence of money
in politics are well known.128 Yet, there is little serious acknowledgment that
the laws and policies undergirding these political failures should be viewed
as aristocratic and thus, as flouting republican government under the
Guarantee Clause. Conversely, scholars of the Guarantee Clause do not
126. Though, one might argue that due process is fundamental to equal citizenship and that
transparency and the separation of powers are indispensable to popular sovereignty, lest the
people lack the knowledge and diverse levers of influence necessary to maintain effective
control over their rulers. Indeed, litigants opposing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court’s 2003 decision protecting the right to same-sex marriage under the Massachusetts state
constitution asked the federal courts to enjoin the decision under the Guarantee Clause,
arguing that the state court violated a core aspect of representative government by usurping
the legislative power to define marriage in violation of the separation of powers. The First
Circuit rejected the argument and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Largess v. Supreme
Jud. Ct., 373 F.3d 219, 229 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 801, 1002 (2004).
127. See, e.g., Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal
Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 435 (1989) (“Now, over
200 years later, the most obvious concerns that prompted adoption of the guarantee clause
have long since passed.”); see also Hasen, supra note 29, at 88 (intimating that the clause’s
anti-monarchical and anti-aristocratic function were pertinent in 1789 and no longer relevant);
WIECEK, supra note 29, at 4, 291 (describing the danger of relapse to aristocracy as “obsolete
today . . . [as] the threat of promonarchical backsliding vanished by 1800” and arguing that
“[the founders’] fear of kings and aristocracies in America are irrelevant today”).
128. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 27, at 505–06; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at
648–49; Michael Klarman, The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Foreword: The Degradation of
American Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10, 46, 195, 207 (2020).
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evaluate these widespread political practices as suppressing representative
government in a way that runs afoul of states’ obligation to maintain
republican forms of government.129 Understanding this connection is not
simply a labor of constitutional excavation.130 It is a process of translation
and adaptation of the kind the founders anticipated and the Guarantee Clause
requires. The Reconstruction Congress adapted the clause to address
extraordinary problems of republican rot that the Framers did not foresee and
at times, blindly ignored. The Guarantee Clause is now called on to do this
work of republican reconstruction again.
Two contemporary political devices that violate both core principles of
popular sovereignty and equal citizenship are worth examining as
particularly egregious yet widely employed examples of the type of
aristocratic encroachments the Guarantee Clause was designed to prevent.
The first is partisan gerrymandering, which subverts the core tenet of popular
sovereignty that the ruled choose their rulers, and devalues the political
participation of some citizens while elevating that of others. The second is
criminal disenfranchisement, which in some states excludes a significant
percentage of the adult population from full and equal participation in selfgovernment.131 Both of these practices deny sovereignty to the full polis and
privilege an elite class with outsize political influence over the composition
and decisions of government.132 And as will be discussed as to each, it
129. Two scholars have recognized the connection between the Guarantee Clause and the
problem of malapportionment but focus on critiquing the Supreme Court’s missed opportunity
to address this practice under the Guarantee Clause as opposed to under an individual rights
framework. McConnell, supra note 10, at 114–15; Ari J. Savitzky, Note, The Law of
Democracy and the Two Luther v. Bordens: A Counterhistory, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2028, 2057–
58 (2011). Jarret Zafran expanded on this analysis by demonstrating the Guarantee Clause’s
salience for addressing entrenchment but again, only focused on the clause as a vehicle for
judicial intervention. See Zafran, supra note 29, at 1454.
130. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1539 (recognizing the task for modern republicans “is
not simply one of excavation” and that “[h]istory does not supply conceptions of political life
that can be applied mechanically to current problems . . . contemporary social and legal issues
can never be resolved merely through recovery of features, however important and attractive,
of the distant past”).
131. A third category of aristocratic political devices that may well also violate the
principles of republican government are practices that permit the audacious influence of
money in politics, both at the campaign and lobbying levels. These devices, at their extremes,
sever the representative and dependent relationship between the governed and the governors
in ways that grant the wealthy a greater share of political power. A full explanation of the
specific aspects of states’ current campaign finance, ethics, and lobbying regimes that run
afoul of republican government is outside of the scope of this Article; suffice it to say here
that they may likewise prove to be modern manifestations of aristocratic devices Congress
may act against under the Guarantee Clause.
132. Professor Deborah Merritt’s argument that the Guarantee Clause protects republican
states against just such kinds of federal encroachment into state political process rights is
unavailing. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 25, 36. Merritt argues that the power to define the
franchise is an exclusively state prerogative. Yet, she concedes that where a state has become
unrepublican, the clause is no barrier to federal intrusion into what she claims are traditional
areas of state autonomy. Indeed, Merritt admits that certain voting qualifications would render
a state’s practices “[in]consistent with republican principles.” Id. at 38. However, she cabins
such voting qualifications to those that the Constitution outlaws under the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Nineteen, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. Outside of these limits,
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matters not under the Guarantee Clause whether the Constitution otherwise
prohibits or permits such practices. Neither constitutional silence nor
acquiescence to a political practice permanently imprints that practice with
republican legitimacy. As specific parts of the Constitution grow
incompatible with evolving standards of republican government, the general
command to ensure states retain a republican government may supersede the
document’s outdated omissions or endorsements.
A. Entrenchment Through Partisan Gerrymandering
Essential to any republic of size is a system of representation, whereby
governing authority is delegated to legislators who remain accountable to the
political will of the sovereign people. Accountability is accomplished
through frequent and fair elections to ensure representatives retain “an
immediate dependence on, & an intimate sympathy with the people.”133 In
the words of John Adams, a republican legislature “should be an equal
representation, or, in other words, equal interests among the people should
have equal interests in it. Great care should be taken to effect this, and to
prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections.”134 Indispensable to this goal
she does not see how other voting restrictions might be inconsistent with popular
representation and intimates that all other restrictions on voting are within a “reservoir of state
power” that could only render a state unrepublican if subsequently outlawed by a
constitutional amendment. Id. at 40. She employs the same analysis for the authority to
organize the structure and mechanics of state government, acknowledging that states cannot
make certain internal governmental process choices that violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments but claims states are otherwise free from “the federal government’s power to
interfere with the organizational structure and governmental process chosen by a state’s
residents.” Id. at 41. She notes in particular that felon disenfranchisement is within a state’s
power to effect, as are drawing state election districts and other election procedures. Id. at 39,
41. Her analysis errs in at least three ways. First, a voting qualification or election procedure
can render a state unrepublican without constituting a separate constitutional violation because
it is the suppression of popular representation that makes a voting restriction unrepublican,
not its defiance of the rule of law. Indeed, there are myriad unrepublican innovations a state
could enact that do not violate an express constitutional provision or federal law, most
especially restrictions that have a disparate political or socioeconomic impact on minority
voters. Currently, voter roll purges, the closing of polling sites, and voter registration barriers
all have an unrepublican impact but are not strictly unconstitutional. The second problem with
her analysis is that it incorrectly interprets the clause as a static right, incapable of responding
to aristocratic “innovations” in the states. Yet, as discussed at length above, all textual and
historical evidence, as well as Supreme Court precedent, belies this interpretation of the
clause. Finally, Merritt does not properly contend with the sovereignty denominator problem
in a federalist society. The American public, as well as the federal government, has a national
sovereign interest in ensuring that each state comports with republican government. While
federal intervention does sometimes override state popular sovereignty, it does so under the
authority of a higher sovereign mandate.
133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 48, at 256 (James Madison).
134. ADAMS, supra note 104, at 195. The Constitution took pains to forestall entrenchment.
Short terms, fixed elections, the inability to tinker with membership qualifications, and a
required decennial census were all included precisely to keep those in power dependent on the
will of the people. Regular and fixed elections and enumerations were designed to essentially
constitutionalize popular representation. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 68, 84; 3 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 51, at 369 (statement of Patrick Henry); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra
note 48 (James Madison).
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is officeholders’ dependence on “the great body of the society, not [on] an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.”135
Partisan gerrymandering is government by a favored class. It is the
legislative practice of drawing electoral districts to discount the votes of some
citizens and to favor the votes of others to ensure the election of an incumbent
party member regardless of popular will. It works by “packing,” “cracking,”
or otherwise assigning citizens to districts in ways designed to minimize the
political efficacy of certain voters’ political participation, ensuring that the
legislature’s preferred candidate will prevail. Sophisticated computer
software has made the tactic cuttingly precise and highly successful,136
helping to create an “incumbent retention rate that rivals the Soviet Union’s
at its height.”137 By facilitating this level of entrenchment, partisan
gerrymandering subverts the dependence relationship between ruler and
ruled. It enables legislators to shape their own districts to ensure their own
reelections to power. In short, it corrupts the fundamental principle of
republican government that the people choose their representatives and not
the other way around.
Contemporary partisan gerrymandering does more than corrupt the
dependence relationship between voters and their representatives, though; its
accuracy is so sophisticated it now threatens the foundational principle of
majority rule. Gerrymanders are most subversive in battleground states,
where democracy ought to be at its zenith as a result of robustly contested
elections. It is in these states, like Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, that partisan gerrymandering is causing
extreme misrepresentation, to the point of installing minority rule. In the
2018 election cycle, it is estimated that seven state legislative chambers that
should have flipped party control based on voter preference did not do so as
a result of partisan gerrymandering.138 In at least Michigan, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, state Democratic candidates won a clear
majority of the statewide popular vote but a minority of the state’s legislative
seats.139
135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 48, at 182 (James Madison).
136. Michael Wines, Just How Bad Is Partisan Gerrymandering?: Ask the Mapmakers,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/us/gerrymander-politicalmaps-maryland.html [https://perma.cc/ST5M-YZ95].
137. Pamela S. Karlan, A Bigger Picture, in REFLECTING ALL OF US: THE CASE FOR
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 73, 73 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999); see also
Election Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/
election-trends [https://perma.cc/A38Q-JYXP] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
138. David A. Lieb, GOP Won More Seats in 2018 than Suggested by Vote Share,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Mar.
21,
2019),
https://apnews.com/
9fd72a4c1c5742aead977ee27815d776 [https://perma.cc/FA8Y-BZYZ].
139. Christopher Ingraham, In at Least Three States, Republicans Lost the Popular Vote
but Won the House, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/2018/11/13/least-three-states-republicans-lost-popular-vote-won-house/
[https://perma.cc/3G8G-RSEA]. Particularly egregious was Wisconsin’s election, in which
Democrats won 53 percent of the popular vote but only 36 percent of the state assembly’s
legislative seats. See Angeliki Kastanis et al., Moving the Flip Zone: Democrats March
Deeper into Suburbia, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 6, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-
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Just as problematic as partisan gerrymandering’s self-entrenchment aspect
is its disparate racial impact. There is a very strong relationship between race
discrimination in voting and partisan gerrymandering, particularly in the
South. Racial minorities overwhelmingly support one of the two major
political parties: 84 percent of Black Americans align with the Democratic
Party, while just 8 percent identify in some way with the Republican Party.140
Partisan disenfranchisement thus in reality amounts to a proxy for racial
disenfranchisement. It is no wonder that partisan gerrymandering increased
precisely when malapportionment subsided, which had served to dilute the
voting power of Black Americans concentrated in cities.141 By drawing
districts to weaken the political ability of Black Americans to elect their
chosen representatives, partisan gerrymandering works an especially
insidious aristocratic encroachment in the tradition of slave aristocracies.
State partisan gerrymandering then quickly translates into
unrepresentativeness at the federal level.
In North Carolina and
Pennsylvania, Democratic congressional candidates won a majority of the
popular vote but only a quarter of the state’s congressional seats because of
partisan gerrymandering.142 Across the country, partisan gerrymandering
tactics ensured that Republicans won sixteen more seats in the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2018 than they otherwise should have.143 More than
twenty bills introduced in that congressional term, addressing security,
defense, climate change, immigration, voting rights, and economic policies,
failed by fewer than twenty votes in the House.144
This self-dealing entrenchment transforms republican government into a
modern form of aristocracy.145 It flouts the core republican principles that
representatives serve at the pleasure of the people and that citizens are
2020-virus-outbreak-phoenix-suburbs-health-care-reform76dea954e5f5dc13b3ad65fd29ac678c [https://perma.cc/8HR5-HQE9].
140. PEW RSCH. CTR., WIDE GENDER GAP, GROWING EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE IN VOTERS’
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 2 (2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/03/20/widegender-gap-growing-educational-divide-in-voters-party-identification/
[https://perma.cc/
5FZT-85H9].
141. See Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One
Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 219 (E. Joshua
Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997).
142. In North Carolina, Democrats won almost exactly half of the votes cast but only three
of the thirteen (23 percent) state congressional districts. See Thomas Wolf & Peter Miller,
How Gerrymandering Kept Democrats from Winning Even More Seats Tuesday, WASH. POST
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/08/how-gerrymanderingkept-democrats-winning-even-more-seats-tuesday/ [https://perma.cc/8K6E-H57W].
In
Pennsylvania, Democrats won 51 percent of the statewide congressional vote but only secured
five out of eighteen (28 percent) congressional seats. See Christopher Ingraham, How
Pennsylvania Republicans Pulled off Their Aggressive Gerrymander, WASH. POST (Feb. 6,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/06/how-pennsylvaniarepublicans-pulled-off-their-aggressive-gerrymander/ [https://perma.cc/KH8S-UG45].
143. See Lieb, supra note 138.
144. See
Voting
Records,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
votes#session=303&chamber[]=2&passed[]=false [https://perma.cc/SU8J-NTHU] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021) (displaying voting records of failed House bills in the 116th Congress).
145. AMAR, supra note 55, at 68.
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entitled to an equal say in who represents them.146 In place of these
principles, gerrymandering substitutes the aristocratic model, in which power
resides in an entrenched class of elite citizens who exercise an outsize share
of political authority to determine the composition of government. Though
partisan gerrymandering does not ensure hereditary entrenchment of power,
heredity is not a necessary feature of aristocratic rule. Heredity is simply a
dated mechanism of entrenchment. Like partisan gerrymandering, it destroys
the representative relationship between the rulers and the ruled, just as it also
elevates the governing authority of one class of citizens over another. By
replacing lineage with data analytics, partisan gerrymandering accomplishes
the same aristocratic goal of perpetually entrenching power in one group,
independent of popular will.
That political gerrymandering is fundamentally unrepublican is not a novel
criticism. As with racial and gender inequality in voting, there is a prolific
history of its disapproval as contrary to republican government from the
outset. The first partisan gerrymander, occurring in Virginia in 1788, was
immediately condemned as unrepublican for being “a violation of the right
of a free people to choose their representatives.”147 The term “gerrymander”
entered the national lexicon a quarter century later when Massachusetts
governor Elbridge Gerry approved an outrageous map that resembled a
The map was emphatically criticized not only as
salamander.148
unconstitutional but also because “it in fact subverts and changes our Form
of Government.”149 Popular condemnation of partisan gerrymandering has
consistently taken the position that it deprives the people of their sovereign
function in a republic.150 A milestone democracy reform bill currently
pending in Congress takes aim at partisan gerrymandering as antithetical to
democracy and finds its elimination necessary “to fulfill the promise of
article IV, section 4.”151
So it was that one of the first times the Guarantee Clause bubbled into the
national political conversation was in response to an uprising that stemmed
from popular discontent with severe disenfranchisement and
malapportionment. The 1841 Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island saw dueling
political factions convene two competing state constitutional conventions to
146. Id. at 68, 84.
147. ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 41 (1907);
see also Thomas Rogers Hunter, The First Gerrymander?: Patrick Henry, James Madison,
James Monroe, and Virginia’s 1788 Congressional Districting, 9 EARLY AM. STUD. 781, 785
(2011).
148. GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 3 (2004); Hunter, supra
note 147, at 807.
149. The Gerry-Mander, or Essex South District Formed into a Monster!, SALEM GAZETTE,
Apr. 2, 1813, https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/ss:3293783 [https://perma.cc/KAE9NSMV].
150. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians in Support of Appellees at 3–4, Gill v. Whitford,
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311107, at *3–4; GRIFFITH, supra note 147,
at 106–07.
151. See For The People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021).
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address the unequal political power between country and city folk as a result
of extremely malapportioned state voting districts.152 The two factions
ultimately established alternative governments and each appealed to the
federal government for recognition and assistance under the Guarantee
Clause.153 While all three branches of the federal government successfully
sidestepped intervening in that political dispute, the relationship between the
Guarantee Clause and the problem of gerrymandering was forged, only to
become stronger ever since.154
As was made clear during Reconstruction, it matters not whether the
Constitution otherwise prohibits partisan gerrymandering or that the practice
has a long history of use for it to be deemed unrepublican under the
Guarantee Clause. Neither long-standing practice nor constitutional
acquiescence to a practice endows it with permanent republican bona fides.
The Constitution did not prohibit racial discrimination or the alienation of
slaves—indeed it explicitly endorsed the political subjugation of slaves. The
practice of disenfranchising and legally discriminating against Blacks, both
slave and free, was ubiquitous throughout the United States, from the
founding, through the Civil War, and thereafter. Yet, such unequal treatment
on the basis of race came to be accepted as antithetical to republican
government and a legitimate target of federal abolition under the Guarantee
Clause. The continued disenfranchisement and discrimination against Black
Americans into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries certainly calls into
question our national commitment to republicanism, but it does not erase the
acceptance of a new democratic norm that unequal treatment on the basis of
race is unrepublican. The same applies to partisan gerrymandering and any
other electoral or political practice that has a deep, if altogether shameful,
history. Neither its historical use, dubious constitutional approval, nor
continued embrace are dispositive for whether, by contemporary standards,
partisan gerrymandering violates the principles of popular sovereignty and
equal citizenship. It clearly does.
B. Criminal Disenfranchisement
The denial of the right to vote is more than an individual rights violation,
it is an infringement on the republican character of a state. Depleting the
pool of citizens rightfully entitled to partake in the franchise leaves
government without the full consent of the governed. The right of suffrage
“is fundamental to republics,” and “consequently secured, because the . . .
constitution, guarantees to every state in the union, a republican form of
government.”155 Where a state disenfranchises a significant number of its
152. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 91–95.
153. See id.
154. The Court considered challenges to malapportionment under the Guarantee Clause but
ultimately held any reliance on that clause was “futile,” opting instead to rest its decision on
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (for state districts) and Article I,
Section 2 (for congressional districts). Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226–27 (1962).
155. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 51, at 448 (statement of James Wilson).
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citizens, thus denying them equal sovereignty, it devolves into an aristocratic
form of government that does not rest on the consent of the people but on the
approval of a favored class.
The Reconstruction Republicans understood this basic rule of
republicanism. When the ex-Confederate states adopted new state
constitutions that continued to disfranchise the now free Black male citizens
of their states, Republicans declared such levels of disenfranchisement to
“violat[e] a distinctive principle of republican government.”156 These states
were, collectively, denying the vote to nearly four million newly freed slaves,
or 12.6 percent of the national population.157 It can be estimated that between
a quarter and half were males of voting age.158 As a percentage of state
population, all of the ex-rebel states were disenfranchising between 10 to 30
percent of their adult male populations on account of race.159 It was only
with the First Reconstruction Act of 1867 that some 703,000 Black
Americans registered to exercise their right to vote in the South.160 In five
states—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—
Black voters became the majority of the registered voting population.161
Today, criminal disenfranchisement produces modern versions of these
levels of illegitimate disenfranchisement. Five and a quarter million citizens
of voting age are denied the right to vote because of a conviction.162 Put in
context, a state of this size would be the twenty-fourth most populous state,
entitled to seven seats in the House of Representatives and nine votes in the
Electoral College. Approximately 1.3 million are disenfranchised prisoners
currently serving sentences,163 possibly for nonfelony offenses, and nearly
3.9 million are not incarcerated and living in our communities.164 Thirty-one
states deny the right to vote to released individuals with certain felony
156. Senator Charles Sumner, Speech in the Senate on the Proposed Amendment of the
Constitution Fixing the Basis of Representation (Feb. 5–6, 1866), in 10 THE WORKS OF
CHARLES SUMNER, supra note 102, at 118, 207. While the Northern states also disenfranchised
their adult Black male citizens, Congress determined, with varying degrees of embitterment,
that this was consistent with republican government because that level of disenfranchisement
was “on so small a scale that it is not perilous to the Republic.” Id. at 135.
157. JOSEPH C. G. KENNEDY, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS LIBR., POPULATION OF THE UNITED
STATES IN 1860, at viii, xii (1864), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications
/decennial/1860/population/1860a-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9L4-289G].
158. Id. at xvii. The ratio of male to female slaves was approximately even (2,216,744
males to 2,225,086 females) and the life expectancy of a slave was thirty-six years. See
ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 125 (1974).
159. See KENNEDY, supra note 157, at xii, xvii. For individual state census data from 1860,
see 1860 Census:
Population of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1864/dec/1860a.html [https://perma.cc/Z7QMGJ96] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
160. COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 4.
161. See LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY
546 (1979).
162. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
163. See Emmett Sanders, Full Human Beings: An Argument for Incarcerated Voter
Enfranchisement, PEOPLE’S POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/
projects/prisoner-voting/ [https://perma.cc/K55N-BJPT] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
164. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.
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convictions who are on parole or probation.165 Thirteen of these states
restrict some or all felons’ right to vote even after they are no longer on parole
or probation.166 Twelve states impose some form of permanent felon
disenfranchisement.167 In all, an estimated 2.3 million people are
disenfranchised under state laws that restrict voting rights after completion
of sentences.168
These levels of disenfranchisement mostly hail from ten states, which
together deny over three quarters of these 5.2 million individuals the right to
vote.169 In six of these states—Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and Virginia—between 6 and 11 percent of the state’s total adult
population is disenfranchised due to prisoner or felon status.170 This is
comparable to the levels of Black male disenfranchisement in several of the
ex-Confederate states deemed unrepublican and subject to the Guarantee
Clause in 1865.
The comparison is made all the more poignant when viewed through a
racial lens. In five states, more than one in six Black Americans is
disenfranchised, and in another four states, more than 10 percent of the state’s
total Black population is denied the right to vote.171 In Tennessee and
Wyoming respectively, over one fifth and one third of adult Black Americans
cannot vote.172 To compound this racial disparity in voting power, prisoners
are almost always counted in the populations of the locations where they are
incarcerated, as opposed to their communities of origin.173 This discrepancy
has the effect of transferring congressional power away from Black
communities into predominantly white, rural communities where prisons are
located.174 The counting of Black prisoners toward the apportionment of
representatives for their predominately white overseers, while
simultaneously denying these prisoners the right to vote, is nothing less than
165. Id. at 5–6.
166. Id.
167. Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/criminaldisenfranchisement-laws-across-united-states [https://perma.cc/7D38-6NCR]; Shayanne Gal
& Grace Panetta, States Have Restored Voting Rights for Thousands with Felony Convictions
Since 2016. See the Laws in Every State, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2020, 11:39 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/where-americans-with-felony-convictions-can-vote-in2020-election-2020-9 [https://perma.cc/E9MD-MNHA].
168. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.
169. They are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 17.
172. See id.
173. See Residence Criteria and Residence Situations for the 2020 Census of the United
States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/programssurveys/decennial/2020-census/2020-Census-Residence-Criteria.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
X5XP-9TNZ] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
174. See Tim Henderson, Counting Prison Inmates Differently Could Shift Political Power,
PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/02/counting-prison-inmates-differently-could-shiftpolitical-power-to-cities [https://perma.cc/DS24-UN44].
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a modern manifestation of the Three-Fifths Clause—which time, war, and
constitutional progress have relegated to the graveyard of grossly
unrepublican political practices.
These statistics lay bare an intolerable abandonment of republican
principles. Disenfranchisement based on conviction unequally excludes a
significant number of citizens from the sovereign public on an illegitimate
basis. The principal reason put forward for denying equal citizenship to those
convicted of a crime is that criminality reflects a lack of civic virtue—an
inability to contribute responsibly to the common task of self-government.
But the commission of a crime is as ill founded an indicator of civic virtue as
race, religion, sex, or gender. There is no evidence that criminality is
correlated with intelligence or virtue. Moreover, criminal law and its
enforcement reflect a series of policy decisions to prioritize the
criminalization and punishment of particular activities that often have little
or no bearing on one’s fitness to participate in the political process. Worse
yet, those policy decisions disparately impact communities on the basis of
intrinsic characteristics—including race, ethnicity, sexuality, and
disability—as well as socioeconomic status, which itself is largely a product
of other policy decisions that negatively impact these demographics.175
Another defense offered for criminal disenfranchisement is that it is a just
punishment. But the argument that the state may penalize citizens by
depriving them of their sovereignty is untenable. While the choice to break
a law can certainly reflect poor judgment, it is outside the power of a
republican state, whose authority is delegated to it by the sovereign people,
to deprive any of the citizens it answers to of their sovereignty based on their
choices or judgments. To illustrate the point, a boss who delegates interim
authority to a subordinate to govern a meeting does not, indeed cannot,
delegate to the subordinate the power to fire the boss—the boss retains her
position and ultimate authority over the subordinate, whether or not she
submits to following any ground rules the subordinate lays out in the course
of managing the meeting. So too in a republic—the state is ever dependent
on and subordinate to the people; even as it exercises legal authority over
them, it cannot tamper with their sovereign authority over the state so long
as they remain capable citizens.
Finally, criminal disenfranchisement is often defended on the basis that it
is implicitly authorized under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 2 reduces a state’s representation in Congress proportionately to the
number of adult male citizens the state disenfranchises, with the exception of
any such citizens disenfranchised for “participation in rebellion, or other
crime.”176 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as affirmatively

175. For further reading on the criminalization of poverty, see generally Monica C. Bell,
Hidden Laws of the Time of Ferguson, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2018); Peter B. Edelman,
Criminalization of Poverty: Much More to Do, 69 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 114 (2020); Kaaryn
Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009); Fred
O. Smith Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283 (2018).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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sanctioning criminal disenfranchisement.177 Regardless of the soundness of
this interpretation, constitutional endorsement of a practice is not
permanently conclusive as to that practice’s republican character. Like
partisan gerrymandering, criminal disenfranchisement violates the principles
of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship by its nature, but its
incompatibility with republicanism grew all the more extreme as the practice
exploded and it became highly racialized. Thus, where provisions of the
Constitution may be democratically legitimate, as reflective of the majority
will of the people, their ratification does not permanently imbue these
provisions with republican legitimacy. One may presume that a majority of
the people’s representatives ratify amendments in compliance with
contemporary standards of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship; but as
those standards evolve, the Guarantee Clause permits a current Congress to
address outmoded practices that no longer comport with republican
government, whether sanctioned by law, historical practice, or constitutional
endorsement.
Current members of Congress have recognized that criminal
disenfranchisement is unrepublican but have failed to follow the
constitutional trail blazed by their predecessors under the Guarantee Clause.
Their bill, the For the People Act,178 would only protect the right of
individuals with criminal convictions to vote in federal elections and would
not extend the franchise to individuals currently serving felony sentences.179
The narrowness of this intervention and its failure to address criminal
disenfranchisement in state elections misses the mark.
The same
shortcoming applies to the pending bill’s sections on redistricting reform.180
The bill would only eliminate partisan gerrymandering in the drawing of
congressional districts. These practices at the state level are as unrepublican
as they are at the federal level and greatly impact the democratic integrity of
the federal government. Congress ought to legislate against them at the state
level too.
The newest version of the For the People Act does purport to rely on
Congress’s “authority and responsibility to enforce the Guarantee Clause,”181
whereas the original version of the bill only relied on Congress’s power to
set the manner of elections under Article I, Section 4 and its power to enforce
the Eighth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth
Amendments.182 This addition is a welcome sign that Congress understands
these problems are not simply individual rights issues. It is not just the
individual who suffers and requires recourse when her political equality is
undermined. It is the entire community and, indeed, the people at large. As
Justice John Marshall Harlan understood in his dissent in Plessy v.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53–56 (1974).
H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).
Id. §§ 1400–1409.
Id. §§ 2400–2435.
Id. § 3.
S. 1068, 116th Cong. (2019).
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Ferguson,183 denying civil rights to citizens “constituting a part of the
political community, called the ‘People of the United States,’ for whom, and
by whom through representatives, our government is administered . . . is
inconsistent with the guaranty given by the constitution to each state of a
republican form of government.”184 Having recognized the underlying harm
to republican government that criminal disenfranchisement and partisan
gerrymandering inflict, Congress ought now to use its guarantee power in
earnest to ban these practices at the state level.
III. ENFORCING THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AGAINST ARISTOCRATIC
STATES
That the Guarantee Clause’s salience is not lost to history raises the
question: how should it be used? Unlike other powers the Constitution
delegates to the federal government, the question of enforcement under the
Guarantee Clause is quite unclear. The clause obscures which federal actor
is the first mover by placing the obligation in Article IV and designating the
entire United States as guarantor.185 Furthermore, the clause is oddly silent
as to its precise enforcement mechanism, making no mention of “appropriate
legislation,”186 “calling forth the Militia,”187 laying taxes,188 judicial
enforcement,189 or any other mode of exercising government authority.190
This omission is in stark contrast to the fairly precise detail the Constitution
supplies for exercising most other powers delegated to the federal
government—such as providing specifics for how to populate the federal
bureaucracy, how to impeach a president, how to ratify an amendment, and
how to join two states.191
Yet, this unanswered, extremely consequential question continues to be
overlooked. The reason, presumably, is that scholars have declared the
clause a constitutional nullity.192 Such disregard stems not only from a
misunderstanding of the clause’s current salience but also from an overactive
focus on judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. In the wake of a nearly
two-hundred-year line of unbroken precedent declaring the Guarantee Clause
nonjusticiable, nearly all scholarly discussion of the clause has nonetheless
fixated on dissecting, debating, and disagreeing with this decision.193
Avenues for enforcing constitutional rights do not start and end at the

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 563–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
See, e.g., id. amend. XIII, § 2.
Id. art I, § 8, cl. 15.
Id. cl. 1.
Id. art III.
Id. art. IV, § 4.
See id. art. I, §§ 2–3; id. art. V; id. art. IV, § 3.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 850–53; Zafran, supra note 29, at 1435.
See supra note 29.
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courthouse steps. Indeed, the Supreme Court is often the least likely and
least capable enforcer of many constitutional rights.194
Few scholars have offered ideas for congressional enforcement of the
Guarantee Clause, and none has fleshed out the mechanisms of congressional
enforcement beyond proposing that Congress pass a specific law addressing
unrepublican activity. Adam Kurland, for example, proposes Congress pass
a state anticorruption law pursuant to the Guarantee Clause,195 and Professor
Mark Alexander argues that the Guarantee Clause enables Congress to pass
campaign finance legislation that satisfies First Amendment scrutiny.196 But
both limit their proposals to passing new legislation, contemplating no more
than Congress’s standard legislative prerogative to impose direct legal
obligations on individuals.197
Substantive legislation that acts on individuals is but one way to rectify
unrepublican activity in the states, but it is not the only way. The Guarantee
Clause endows Congress with three distinct mechanisms for enforcing the
guarantee: it may legislate directly under the Guarantee Clause against
individuals and state governments to prohibit unrepublican state practices; it
may use its ancillary Article I powers to incentivize states to adopt needed
republican reforms; and, in cases of necessity, it may dissolve a state
government and convene a state constitutional convention.
Textual, purposivist, and historical analyses of the clause all support this
interpretation. Importantly, this reading recognizes that the “clause was
powerfully and publicly glossed” by its use in the aftermath of the Civil War
to carry Reconstruction into effect and by the repeated endorsement of this
use of the clause by the American people in a series of watershed elections
during Reconstruction.198
What little the Supreme Court has said about the scope and substance of
Congress’s guarantee power also supports a broad and dynamic
understanding of this authority. The Court’s early opinions on the separation
of powers squarely place responsibility for effectuating the Constitution’s
general powers in Congress and embrace the notion of wide legislative
discretion to adopt “new changes and modifications of power [that] might be
indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter.”199 Where
details are scant and power is expressed in general terms, the Constitution
194. See infra Part IV.B.
195. Kurland, supra note 127, at 435–36.
196. Alexander, supra note 29, at 823–38.
197. Rick Hasen gets closer by contemplating whether a system of federal preclearance for
state changes to voting laws could be justified under the Guarantee Clause, but he does not
flesh out this idea in depth. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the
Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
177, 204–06 (2005). Arthur Bonfield also envisions a robust role for Congress in enforcing
the Guarantee Clause, but he focuses his analysis on the scope of the guarantee as opposed to
the mechanisms of enforcement, assuming the clause would operate through the passage of
new legislation protecting social and political rights. Bonfield, supra note 14, at 565–69.
198. Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 109, 110 (2013).
199. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
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“leav[es] to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to
effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its
powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should require.”200
The Court reiterated this model of congressional primacy and latitude in
its first major exposition of the Guarantee Clause, declaring that, “[u]nder
this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a State,” to “determine whether it is
republican or not,” and “the means proper to be adopted to fulfil this
guarantee.”201 The Court has not waivered on this holding. Even in the midst
of Reconstruction, an unsympathetic, conservative Supreme Court ultimately
sanctioned Congress’s use of the Guarantee Clause to impose military rule
and direct the formation of new state governments, acknowledging that “a
discretion in the choice of means is necessarily allowed” for Congress to
restore “the State to its constitutional relations, under a republican form of
government.”202 Even as the Court subsequently dismantled the advances of
Reconstruction piece by piece,203 it never renounced its endorsement of the
Guarantee Clause as empowering Congress to use all means necessary and
proper to intervene in the political affairs of the states.204
The Framers of the Guarantee Clause understood that the American
experiment with republicanism was fragile—that internal and external threats
to the system abounded. They meant to give the federal government a
powerful and adaptive tool to protect the nascent and tenuous national project
they had launched.205 This tool was designed to address the immediate
200. Id. at 326–27.
201. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–43 (1849). The Luther opinion deals mostly
with the power of the president, vis-à-vis the courts, to determine the rightful government of
a state and suppress insurrection against it. That analysis, however, does not pertain to the
president’s constitutional authority under the Guarantee Clause but rather, to the president’s
statutory authority under the Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424, in which Congress
delegated “the power of deciding whether [an] exigency had arisen upon which the
government of the United States is bound to interfere.” Id. at 43.
202. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729 (1868).
203. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1906) (gutting congressional
authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548–52
(1896) (sanctioning racial segregation under the Equal Protection Clause), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24–25 (1883)
(denying federal authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to outlaw racial
discrimination by private actors); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883)
(immunizing state inaction against civil rights violations); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 551, 553–55 (1876) (restricting the Fourteenth Amendment to state action and
holding it did not incorporate the Bill of Rights); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 216
(1876) (eviscerating the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77–81 (1873) (nullifying the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 590–93 (1871)
(circumscribing the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
204. See Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 135, 183 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that the Guarantee Clause authorizes Congress to intervene in the
“administration of the affairs of the state” to secure republican government).
205. See Martin, 14 U.S. at 326 (“The [Constitution] was not intended to provide merely
for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events
of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence. It could not be foreseen
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known threats of monarchical usurpation and aristocratic encroachments and
to provide a sufficiently nimble and broad grant of authority to confront the
unforeseeable manifestations of this threat in the future.
The threat did indeed metastasize in other forms, including through the
institution of slavery and various subsequent manifestations of
disempowerment, discrimination, and disenfranchisement.
Yet, the
constitutionally available mechanisms for excising these political practices
via the guarantee power have lain dormant. Understanding this power
through a textual, purposivist, and historical lens excavates at least three
means of enforcement: federal legislation, federal incentives, and state
reconstruction. Only by moving beyond what the clause guarantees to how
it guarantees it will the political potential of the Guarantee Clause
reawaken.206
A. Legislating Against Unrepublican State Practices
The Guarantee Clause is an independent source of legislative power to
restructure state governments in conformity with republican principles. This
legislative function of the clause supplements Congress’s other legislative
powers in a distinct way, even as it complements Congress’s auxiliary
authorities to protect due process, equal protection, and constitutional
franchise requirements. It was an entirely unique grant of authority under the
1788 Constitution, and it was then reinforced by new provisions expanding
Congress’s legislative enforcement powers under the voting rights and
Reconstruction Amendments. The guarantee power remains, however, the
only general federal authority to intervene directly in the states’ republican
relations with its people, not limited to specific prohibitions like poll taxes or
to practices that are racially discriminatory or that affect interstate commerce.
The clause makes clear that one vehicle for exercising this general grant
of power is through congressional legislation. The Constitution attaches the
guarantee obligation to “The United States.” The Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article I grants Congress the authority to “make all laws” necessary
for carrying into execution the powers the Constitution vests in “the United
States.”207 In addition, the Constitution uses the term “United States” when
referring to the federal government as a sovereign whole, comprised of three
branches, each exercising a separate core governing function.208 A general
grant of authority to “the United States,” therefore, is a grant to each branch
to exercise its constitutionally assigned function in enforcing that provision.
Under the Guarantee Clause, it is for Congress to legislate against
what new changes and modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general
objects of the charter; and restrictions and specifications, which, at the present, might seem
salutary, might, in the end, prove the overthrow of the system itself.”).
206. Senator Charles Sumner famously depicted the Guarantee Clause as the “sleeping
giant in the Constitution, never until this recent war awakened, but now it comes forward with
a giant’s power.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner).
207. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
208. See, e.g., id. pmbl; id. art. VI.
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unrepublican practices, the executive to enforce that legislation, and the
judiciary to adjudicate any resulting disputes.
The clause’s verbiage is similarly instructive. It obligates the federal
government to “guarantee” a republican form of government to every state,
conferring one of the only positive rights in the original Constitution. As
discussed, this affirmative obligation necessarily implies the authority to
employ both preventive and corrective measures.209 It similarly permits
interventions short of using military force. The primary constitutional
method for enacting preventative, peaceful measures is congressional
legislation.
Even the placement of the Guarantee Clause in Article IV points to its
fount as a source of legislative authority. Article IV consists of seven clauses
on states’ relations and obligations, including several grants of lawmaking
authority to Congress to enforce these obligations. At the same time, it is not
where the Constitution places its negative restraints on states’ authority.
Those are listed in Article I, Section 10. The placement of the Guarantee
Clause in Article IV, therefore, emphasizes its role as a positive grant of
lawmaking authority as opposed to a negative restraint on states’ authority.
The enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments shed further
light on the proper interpretation of the Guarantee Clause’s legislative
function. Each of the Reconstruction Amendments includes a provision
explicitly empowering Congress to enforce the rights established by that
amendment through appropriate legislation. Congress drafted these
enforcement clauses as it was passing legislation to impose the very legal
transformations it intended to make permanent through the Reconstruction
Amendments. In so doing, Congress likely modeled the enforcement
provisions it drafted on the enforcement authority it was currently exercising
to preserve for itself the authority to protect and advance the rights won under
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.210
209. See supra Part I.C. Classical republicanism, as a political theory, is distinct for
promising a positive conception of freedom: “Where liberalism has historically promised
‘negative’ freedom or ‘freedom from’ government intrusions into a protected domain of
private right, republicanism affirms the possibility of a more encompassing ‘positive’
freedom—the freedom of prescribing to one’s self, across a more encompassing domain, the
laws to which one will be subject.” Richard Fallon Jr., Comment, What Is Republicanism, and
Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1721 (1989).
210. It is an open question what space lies between Congress’s enforcement powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. While the original purposes of the
provisions are quite similar in that they both aim to empower the federal government to ensure
republican government in the states, the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily concerned with
denying the abridgment of natural law rights by states, whereas the guarantee power is
concerned with ensuring that state structures adhere to republican principles. In theory, there
is little room here between substance and form. But the space between the two provisions has
ultimately widened drastically as a result of the Supreme Court cabining the scope of the rights
protected by Section 1 and Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–27 (2000); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24–25 (1883);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553–55 (1876); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77–81 (1873).
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Finally, the Guarantee Clause’s lawmaking power is confirmed by the
surplusage canon. The guarantee power is not redundant of Congress’s other
legislative reserves and should not be interpreted as such. It does enjoy some
overlap, as many constitutional provisions do.211 But even setting aside that
the clause would have filled a major gap in Congress’s legislative power at
the founding, before there were any amendments guaranteeing the rights of
republican citizens and when the Commerce Clause had only a fragment of
its current stature, the guarantee power still retains a distinct legislative
function today.
First, the clause permits tailored legislation against specific states that the
principle of equal state sovereignty otherwise makes difficult under other
legislative authorities.212 The clause applies to “every State,” in the singular,
not to all the states as a group.213 It was conceived amidst concerns over
turmoil in specific states,214 and it was drafted and has only ever been used
to intervene in individual states where republican government has broken
down.215 Moreover, it explicitly displaces background principles of
federalism by speaking directly to the proper constitutional balance between
federal power and state sovereignty under the clause—in instances of
domestic violence, the state must approve the federal interference,216 and in
cases of invasion or breakdown of republican government, the federal
government is obligated to intervene, with no prior consent of the state
required.217
Substantively, the guarantee power may be the exclusive vehicle for
imposing a host of necessary republican reforms. For example, it is likely
the only means of redressing non-voting-related state political practices that
corrode the dependency relationship between representatives and the people.
Such practices include corrupt lobbying, special access, and campaign
finance practices that trade influence, access, money, and favors for power.
It would also reach state actions that have an outsize effect on the ability of
the poor to participate in self-government, including the closure of polling
sites, voter roll purges, the absence of early voting procedures, and holding
elections on weekdays. Indeed, it is the apex of aristocracy to have to pay to
vote because one is forced to choose whether to go to work or to the polls.

211. For example, Congress’s commerce and enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment both permit it to enact legislation outlawing employment discrimination.
Similarly, a combination of the Elections and Commerce Clauses and Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments provide overlapping authority to legislate against unrepublican state practices.
It is perhaps no surprise, therefore, that Congress has never purported to act exclusively
pursuant to the Guarantee Clause.
212. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544–46 (2013).
213. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (requiring the federal government to guarantee each state a
republican government “on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence”).
217. Id.
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Furthermore, the guarantee power could further singularly reach
unrepublican state practices that are not explicitly racially discriminatory,
such as the failure to provide adequate state services.218 It is also the only
constitutional means of abrogating state sovereign immunity for
unrepublican practices that fall outside the protective umbrella of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It can further be employed against
unchecked unrepublican practices by private actors that do not substantially
affect interstate commerce, such as gender-based violence or gun violence,
on a finding these activities interfere with individuals’ exercise of their full
political rights as citizens.219 In all these ways, the legislative potential of
the guarantee power is not superfluous. But it is also not the only, or even
the most effective, mechanism for enforcing the guarantee.
B. Incentivizing State Political Reform
Beyond the power to act directly on the states, the Guarantee Clause
permits Congress to use its other Article I powers to incentivize state
compliance with republican principles. Offering incentives instead of
legislating directly has optical and practical advantages. Incentives are more
politically palatable and thus more politically feasible to enact. They foster
state buy-in for effectuating large-scale shifts in social and political norms
and permit Congress to seek legal changes it cannot otherwise
constitutionally mandate.
The use of incentives is especially valuable for ushering in more
permanent republican reforms. Federal legislation is but one source of law
for addressing unrepublican practices; three others include state statutes, state
constitutions, and the U.S. Constitution—the latter two being far more secure
avenues for implementing lasting republican reforms. While Congress may
not legislate a change to these bodies of law, it may use federal incentives to
spur lasting changes in all three.
Principles of federalism baked into our constitutional scheme prevent the
federal government from compelling a state to change its law or
commandeering state agents, including a state legislature, into implementing
federal policy.220 But it is uncontroversial that Congress may condition a
federal incentive on a state adopting a particular legal policy.221 The primary
limitations on this power are: (1) that the required condition relate to a
federal interest and not violate another constitutional provision and (2) that
the incentive not be unduly coercive or fall outside Congress’s power to
offer.222 Congress may, consistent with these limitations, fulfill its guarantee
218. Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44, 57 (1973).
219. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
220. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
221. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
222. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012); Dole, 483 U.S.
at 207–08, 210–12. The condition must also promote the general welfare and be unambiguous
and should relate to “the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.” Sebelius,
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obligation by inducing states to pass new law—including constitutional
law—in exchange for monetary incentives or, in certain circumstances, for
seating a state’s congressional delegation in Congress.
1. Constitutional Conditions: States Passing Laws and Amendments
The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that Congress may seek to
induce a state to change its law without running afoul of any constitutional
limitations.223 This is because a state is free to accept or rebuff a federal
offer. In other words, the privilege of state sovereignty in a federal system
sometimes requires the states to act autonomously. Today, most states have
ethics, election access, and voting integrity laws pending in their
legislatures.224 The federal government can, and should, incentivize states’
passage of these republican reforms.
The analysis is the same for a condition requiring a state legislature to
approve a state or federal constitutional amendment addressing an
unrepublican practice. Such state legislative votes are no different than those
cast to pass a state statute. Indeed, this type of condition is somewhat less
intrusive on state sovereignty because these votes have no binding legal
effect without additional popular approval: a state legislature’s vote for a
state constitutional amendment requires approval by popular referendum in
all but one state before it becomes law,225 and a vote to ratify a federal
constitutional amendment requires the assent of thirty-seven other states and
two-thirds of the Congress.226
A condition for states to pass a constitutional amendment aimed at
improving governing structures and political process rights complies with
both limitations on Congress’s conditioning power. First, it relates to the
legitimate federal interest in guaranteeing republican government in the
states.227 Recall that the Reconstruction Congress conditioned readmission
567 U.S. at 676 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts
v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
223. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577–78.
224. See, e.g., H.R. 37, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2021) (restoring voting rights to persons
who have been released from incarceration for five or more years and eliminating the
requirement that persons with past criminal convictions pay fines and victim restitution before
having their voting rights restored); H.R. 417, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021)
(establishing recusal requirements for the secretary of state and an independent election board
to supervise elections upon recusal); H.R. 411, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021)
(allowing certain incarcerated individuals to vote by absentee ballot); H.R. 377, 101st Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021) (requiring schools to allow students to leave school
temporarily to vote); S.J. Res. 272, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2021) (removing restrictions
on qualifications to vote for convicted felons or individuals adjudicated to be “mentally
incompetent”); S. 739, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020) (concerning language accessibility
requirements on ballots).
225. Delaware is the only state that permits its legislature to pass an amendment to its state
constitution without popular ratification. See DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
226. U.S. CONST. art V.
227. Cf. Merritt, supra note 29, at 70. Merritt argues that “this ability of Congress to
override state substantive authority through the supremacy clause—while preserving the
autonomy of state governmental processes under the guarantee clause—assures a proper

2021]

RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS

2203

of the ex-Confederate states on their ratifying the Fourteenth and, in some
cases the Fifteenth, Amendment.228 The condition to ratify these
amendments directly related to the federal interest in reconstructing
republican government in those states, “precisely because the
amendment[s] . . . revolved in tight orbit around core principles of republican
government.”229 Campaigns for state constitutional amendments proposing
political reforms have been initiated in a number of the states, including
amendments designed to reform the redistricting process, improve campaign
finance accountability and transparency, and expand access to voting.230
Congress may condition an incentive on a state’s passing these state
constitutional amendments or similar federal constitutional amendments.
Second, such a ratification condition does not run afoul of any other
constitutional provision. It does not induce an unconstitutional act by the
states, as the Constitution grants state legislatures the authority to ratify an
amending bill. It is also a constitutional exercise of congressional power,
consistent with both Article V and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
Article V amendment process is a political process within Congress’s
purview to control.231 If it so wishes to spur that process along via its
ancillary powers, it is within Congress’s political prerogative to do so.
Indeed, the Constitution twice approves the notion of binding states to
constitutional reforms without perfect consent. Article V only requires threefourths of the states to ratify an amendment, and Article VII approves binding
all thirteen original states to a new Constitution upon the consent of only
nine.232 A “ratification condition” scheme does not come close to imposing
this level of constitutional coercion on the states.233
balance between national power and state independence.” Id. Just the opposite balance is
appropriate. The federal government is dependent on, and largely comprised of, state actors,
giving the federal government a significant interest in the integrity of state political processes.
Additionally, the Constitution is structured to keep most substantive law within the states’
prerogatives. Thus, while the Supremacy Clause does some work in balancing out federalstate relations, it does not replace the federal government’s distinct self-preservation interest
in republican state governmental processes. Indeed, a potentially more efficient way of
ensuring beneficial state substantive law is to ensure a well-functioning state political process
that produces law responsive to the people’s interests, rather than to override every detrimental
state law via the Supremacy Clause.
228. See Bonfield, supra note 14, at 540–41; White, supra note 14, at 801.
229. AMAR, supra note 55, at 377.
230. See, e.g., S. 668, 2019 Leg., 54th Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019) (containing recently ratified
New Mexico ethics reforms); Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2018-135 (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.
arkansasag.gov/assets/opinions/2018-135.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS47-8RA7] (discussing fair
redistricting state constitutional amendments pending in Arkansas); Letter from Donald J.
McTigue, Att’y, Ohioans for Secure and Fair Elections, to Dave Yost, Ohio Att’y Gen. (Feb.
10, 2020), https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/c380e08c-ef3f-4408-bfb6ad4530339393/The-Secure-and-Fair-Elections-Amendment-(Resubmiss.aspx [https://perma
.cc/5NFM-QVEW] (election access); S.D. Att’y Gen, Constitutional Amendment: Attorney
General’s Statement (June 19, 2017), https://sdsos.gov/elections-voting/assets/Ballot
%20Question%20Documents/2018/2018_CA_AGStatement_V1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2APD
-8DCC] (anti-corruption).
231. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450–51 (1939).
232. U.S. CONST. arts. V, VII.
233. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 50.
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Enforcing the guarantee through a ratification condition is also consistent
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, especially where a constitution (state
or federal) is facilitating unrepublican practices. Constitutions impose
unrepublican government on the people when a court interprets a provision
to create an unrepublican outcome or when a provision of a constitution
comes to be recognized as unrepublican. An example of the first scenario is
the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford234 case, in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the word “citizens” in the Constitution not to include Black
Americans.235 An example of the second scenario is the Three-Fifths Clause,
which granted slave states extra representation in Congress. To restore
republican government in either scenario, it is necessary to pass an
amendment overturning a constitutional holding or superseding a
constitutional provision. Modern examples of this might include spurring an
amendment to overturn the Supreme Court’s campaign finance holdings or
to supersede the constitutional provisions establishing the Electoral College
or equal state representation in the Senate.
Not only are ratification conditions consistent with Articles I and V, but
they closely mirror Congress’s well-settled authority under Article IV to
condition the admission of new states into the Union on changes to the
proposed state’s law. Like the Guarantee Clause, the section empowering
Congress to admit new states into the Union does not specify any procedures
for, or limits on, executing this authority.236 Yet, Congress has consistently
used this power to impose conditions on new states to ensure the state is a
cohesive member of a republican federal system.237 Indeed, Congress has
imposed conditions on nearly every state admitted to the Union post-1788,
including conditions to alter a territory’s legal system and to guarantee
certain civil liberties when Congress was suspicious of a new state’s
commitment to democratic governance.238
2. Constitutional Incentives: Financial Carrots and Seating Sticks
Congress has two principal powers at its disposal for incentivizing states
to enact republican reforms: the spending power (a carrot) and the seating
power (a stick).239 When acting pursuant to the Guarantee Clause, Congress
may use these Article I powers to condition federal money and
representatives’ seating in Congress on state legislatures approving new laws
necessary to restore republican government.

234. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
235. Id. at 404.
236. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
237. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120–21 (2004).
238. See id. at 139.
239. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Use of the spending power to this end is clearly constitutional.240 As
discussed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed Congress’s power to
financially incentivize state action, so long as the financial inducement
offered is not “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion.’”241 In using its spending power to enforce its guarantee
obligation, Congress may offer new funds in exchange for the adoption of
new policies or offer to pay for the political reforms it seeks. It may also
threaten to withdraw funding from state agencies engaging in unrepublican
practices or condition the continued receipt of a reasonable amount of
existing funding on a state enacting desired reforms.242 The Supreme Court
has already sanctioned Congress’s use of its spending power in this way at
least once by upholding, as a condition of funding, a requirement that state
agencies prohibit their employees from taking active part in political
campaigns.243
The seating power is a more limited, yet very powerful, stick available to
Congress to incentivize state compliance with republican principles. Article
I permits each chamber of Congress to “be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its own Members.”244 Under this provision, Congress
is the ultimate authority on whether one of its members was duly elected and
is duly qualified to serve. Article I lists three qualifications for membership,
in the form of age, residency, and citizenship requirements.245
But it also implies a fourth, tacit requirement that members are elected in
a republican manner and represent republican states. The Constitution
requires members of Congress to be elected by the people.246 These words
carry the implicit requirement that members be chosen in a republican
manner by citizens who enjoy complete equality in their shared right to
popular representation.247 The Constitution’s vesting of the legislative
240. Even Professor Merritt agrees that “induc[ing] changes in state governmental
structures” through the spending clause is a legitimate use of federal power that comports with
federalism principles. Merritt, supra note 29, at 46–49.
241. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
242. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012).
243. See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947).
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
245. Id. § 3.
246. Id. § 2 (providing that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,” who shall, “when elected, be
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen”); id. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof,
for six years.”).
247. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8, 14 (1964). In Wesberry, the Court held
malapportionment in congressional districts unconstitutional, reasoning that, “construed in its
historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2 that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People
of the several States’ means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another’s.” Id. at 7–8 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2). The
Court continued:
To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the
principle of a House of Representatives elected “by the People” . . . .
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power in a Congress similarly presumes this body to be exactly what that
word implies—a republican deliberative body comprised of representatives
from republican states.248 Reading an implied republican requirement into
Article I’s qualifications for office does not run afoul of the separate
requirements that each state have at least one representative and that no state
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate, because both those provisions
assume that the representatives and states in question are true representatives
and proper states in good constitutional standing under the Guarantee Clause.
A tacit republican qualification is also consistent with the Constitution’s
recognition that Congress has an independent institutional interest in the
integrity of congressional elections.249 For this reason, Article I permits
Congress to supersede the states’ authority to make the rules for federal
elections.250 It also permits Congress to punish a member for bad behavior
and to expel a member.251 In the same way, the seating power enables
Congress to protect its institutional interests by refusing to admit a
representative elected in an unrepublican manner.
It is thus constitutionally appropriate for Congress to incentivize a state to
pass republican reforms by refusing to seat that state’s representatives where
the states’ unrepublican practices directly impacted the unrepublican
character of its congressional delegation. Use of the seating power in this
particular way is not unduly coercive because it is fully within both
Congress’s power and its duty to ensure its own compliance with Article I.252
While Congress may remedy most problems related to the republican
integrity of federal elections under the Elections Clause, the Guarantee
Clause recognizes the interrelation between state and federal political
systems and how state and local unrepublican practices can directly impinge
the ability of citizens to participate fairly and equally in federal elections.
Where a state has proven demonstrably recalcitrant to self-correcting those
unrepublican practices affecting the integrity of its election systems,
Congress may use the seating power to induce the state into enacting the
necessary republican reforms.

....
. . . The House of Representatives, the Convention agreed, was to represent the
people as individuals, and on a basis of complete equality for each voter.
Id. at 8, 14.
248. Cf. Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment:
Normative Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 174 (2017)
(arguing that a tacit loyalty requirement should be read into Article V and indeed, into the
grant of all federal political power).
249. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.”).
251. Id. § 5.
252. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A
Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1347 (2013) (“[A]
conditional proposal is coercive if it would be wrongful for the maker to do as it threatens.”).
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Unlike the spending power, therefore, the seating power may only be used
reactively to enforce the Guarantee Clause. It would be undemocratic to
refuse to seat a member in anticipation of, or speculation over, a state’s
unrepublican character. Similarly, where a state’s federal election system
fully complies with the principles of popular sovereignty and equal
citizenship, Congress may not use the seating power to induce entirely
unrelated republican reforms. Otherwise, Congress would be attempting to
restore republicanism in a way that risks eviscerating it. Refusing to seat a
duly elected representative would itself violate the principle of popular
sovereignty and discriminate among equal citizens of different states.
Case law and historical practice support Congress’s use of the seating
power to enforce the Guarantee Clause. The Supreme Court grasped the link
between Congress’s seating power and the Guarantee Clause from the outset,
reasoning in its first exposition of the guarantee power that Congress’s
admission of senators and representatives under Article I amounts to its
recognition under Article IV that the states from which they are elected are
republican in character.253 It was this analysis that later inspired the
Reconstruction Republicans to use the seating power to enforce the guarantee
Having
of republican government in the ex-Confederate states.254
determined that the representatives these states sent to Congress in 1865 were
not elected in a republican manner, they deemed them unqualified under
Article I to serve in Congress.255
Importantly, their conclusion was not based on the ex-Confederate states’
former support for slavery and secession. Rather, it was based on their
ongoing disenfranchisement of the freed slaves, their adoption of Black
Codes to undo the recently ratified Thirteenth Amendment, and their refusal
to ratify the then pending Fourteenth Amendment.256 These acts evinced an
obstinate commitment to retaining a race-based aristocracy instead of
embracing a new republican norm of race-blind citizenship. By perpetuating
a web of political, social, and economic discrimination, the entire political
apparatus of the ex-Confederate states retained its unrepublican character,
which impugned the republican qualification of its delegations to Congress.
In response, Congress conditioned the readmission of representatives from
these states on their establishing republican forms of government,
specifically by adopting a requirement of race-blind suffrage in their state
constitutions and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires equal
citizenship and the exclusion of disloyal citizens from the ranks of
government.257
In its most extreme iteration, therefore, the Guarantee Clause empowers
Congress to use the seating power to induce a state into voting to ratify an
amendment to the Constitution. Bruce Ackerman has argued that such a
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
See AMAR, supra note 55, at 370.
See id. at 368–69.
See id. at 368–69, 377–78.
See COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 4.
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process, as was used during Reconstruction, is so irregular that it does not
comport with Article V.258 Akhil Amar has countered that the exConfederate members were properly excluded because they were elected
under unrepublican conditions, and the ratification condition was necessary
to restore republican government in those states.259 The disagreement has
been framed in terms of constitutional theory. But a more basic way to
understand the divergence is that Ackerman finds such an incentive scheme
unconstitutionally coercive, whereas Amar recognizes that withholding
something one is not qualified to have in the first place cannot, by definition,
be coercive. Amar is right. Such a scheme lacks duress or undue influence.
First, the state remains free to restore republican government voluntarily by
its own means, which would render the incentive scheme unjustified and thus
inoperable. Second, both the inducement (seating in Congress) and the
condition (ratification) are legal, discretionary acts. Congress has full
authority to expel members from unrepublican states, and this slimmed-down
Congress may propose amendments and attach ratification conditions to
them consistent with Article V. It is true that Article V authorizes “The
Congress” to propose amendments for ratification, but it is also Congress
who judges its own membership and therefore defines what body properly
constitutes “The Congress” for purposes of Article V.
In sum, incentivizing a state to approve new law—including a new
constitutional amendment—under either the spending or the seating power
is, in certain circumstances, a constitutional exercise of the guarantee power.
Under the spending power, such an incentive scheme falls squarely within
Congress’s Article I powers and is not inconsistent with Article V so long as
it is not coercive. Under the seating power, it is proper to demand new laws
ensuring congressional representatives are elected in a republican manner
when such a law or amendment is necessary to restore republican government
in the states and in Congress.
C. Dissolving and Reconstructing State Government
Finally, in cases of severe republican collapse, the Guarantee Clause
empowers Congress to dissolve a state government and convene a state
constitutional convention to replace it.260 This was the tactic successfully
pursued during Reconstruction, but it is undertheorized whether, outside the
context of secession and war, doing so is within Congress’s constitutional
purview. It is. The Guarantee Clause permits this extreme remedy in
response to a total breakdown in republican government, such as when a state
operates under a political caste system—whether on the basis of race, gender,
class, property, or any other intrinsic or constructed distinction—or when a
state eviscerates popular sovereignty by cancelling, stealing, or corrupting its
elections.

258. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 22–119.
259. AMAR, supra note 55, at 364–80.
260. See supra Part I.B.
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The clause guarantees every state a republican “form” of government. At
the time of the clause’s drafting, the “form” of a state government was
predominately established by state constitution, not substantive law.261
Textually, the clause thus empowers Congress to guarantee a republican
constitution to each state. Focusing on this connection between the guarantee
and the law of state constitutions, early abolitionists read the clause as
empowering Congress to “dictate the form of [a state’s] fundamental code or
constitution, with a view of rendering it consistent with . . . [a republican]
form of government.”262 Not long after, the Supreme Court recognized
Congress’s authority under the clause to decide “what government is the
established one in a State.”263 The power to recognize a state government
includes the inverse power of nonrecognition—or rather, the power to
recognize the currently constituted government as illegitimate.264
The Reconstruction Congress interpreted its power under the Guarantee
Clause in exactly this way. The linchpin of its Reconstruction agenda was
unrecognizing the ex-Confederate states, dissolving these states’
governments and their post-Confederate constitutions, and convening new
state conventions for the adoption of new state constitutions that were subject
to congressional approval.265
This use of the Guarantee Clause was reaffirmed by both coordinate
branches and the people of the United States, imprinting it with constitutional
legitimacy. The public twice lent its consent at the ballot box, reelecting the
Republicans overwhelmingly in 1866, after Congress had excluded Southern
delegates from its membership, and again in 1868, following the
implementation of Reconstruction in all eleven ex-Confederate states.266
Importantly, the 1868 election was held after the reformation and
readmittance of seven Southern states under the terms of the First
Reconstruction Act, with the participation of voters in those states.267
Both President Johnson and the Supreme Court, while at furious odds with
this scheme, nonetheless acquiesced to this use of the guarantee power.268
Johnson’s military maintained martial law, registered the freed Blacks to
vote, and convened the state constitutional conventions.269 The Supreme
Court similarly acceded in a trio of cases. In Mississippi v. Johnson,270 the
Court refused to prevent the president’s implementation of the First
Reconstruction Act, even as it described the Act as “annihilat[ing] the State
and its government, by assuming for Congress the power to control, modify,

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See Heller, supra note 29, at 1717, 1745–46.
12 REG. DEB. 4269 (1836).
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 30 (2015).
See Bonfield, supra note 14, at 540–41; supra Part I.B.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 19–21.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
WIECEK, supra note 29, at 233–37.
See COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 4–5.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
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and even abolish its government.”271 Next, in Georgia v. Stanton,272 the
Court declined again to intercede to protect the Southern states’ “rights of
sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, [and] of corporate
existence as a state” from federal intervention.273 It deemed these rights
judicially unenforceable, fully understanding that judicial abstention would
permit Congress to
annul, and totally abolish the existing State government of Georgia, and
establish another and different one in its place; in other words, would
overthrow and destroy the corporate existence of the State, by depriving it
of all the means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might, and,
otherwise would, be maintained.274

Finally, in Texas v. White,275 unable to dispose of the question on
jurisdictional grounds, the Court gave its constitutional imprimatur to
Reconstruction.276 It held that the excluded states remained sovereign
entities, inescapably implying that their status as wards of federal
Reconstruction did not unconstitutionally violate their state sovereignty.277
The Court further confirmed that the guarantee of a republican form of
government is bestowed on the people of a state, not on the state government,
holding in essence that destruction of a state government to provide a
republican state to the people is within Congress’s authority under the
Guarantee Clause.278
As the Supreme Court ultimately conceded, enforcing the Guarantee
Clause by dissolving a state government, nullifying its constitution, and
erecting a new republican government in its place is fully consistent with
republicanism itself. Undeniably, the people of the states must be able to
form their own state governments free of undue federal interference or
compulsion, otherwise the resulting state would also violate popular
sovereignty.279 But federal intervention does not necessarily destroy the
republican relationship between the people and their elected representatives.
In certain instances, intervention is necessary to uphold and protect that
relationship. For example, the mechanism of federal preclearance adopted

271. Id. at 476.
272. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868).
273. Id. at 77.
274. Id. at 76.
275. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
276. See id. at 727–29, 731.
277. See id. at 726–29.
278. See id. at 721. The Court nonetheless insisted that it was not passing judgment on the
constitutionality of the First Reconstruction Act. Id. at 731 (“Nothing in the case before us
requires the court to pronounce judgment upon the constitutionality of any particular provision
of these acts . . . . We do not inquire here into the constitutionality of this legislation so far as
it relates to military authority, or to the paramount authority of Congress.”).
279. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 25, 61; Andrew Johnson, Veto Message (Mar. 2, 1867),
reprinted in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897,
at 498, 511 (James D. Richardson ed., Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Off. 1897) (vetoing
the First Reconstruction Act).
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in the Voting Rights Act of 1965280 constitutionally permits federal review
of laws passed by a state legislature exercising popularly delegated
authority.281 It does so not to depress popular control but to vindicate it—to
ensure that state law does not ultimately hamper the people’s ability to
exercise their popular sovereignty. So too with a republican reconstruction
of a state government. In that case, Congress would be interfering to
facilitate a process by which the people could more freely exercise their
sovereignty in a new convention.
Moreover, it is imperative to grasp that popular sovereignty does not end
at the state border. While federal intervention may be unrepublican at one
level, it is also the manifestation of a national republican system operating to
ensure compliance with a national republican Constitution. The people of
the United States are also a popularly sovereign body and their collective
will, as represented through federal action, is deserving of recognition in a
republican system.282
Where a state is not simply engaging in unrepublican practices but has
abandoned a republican form of government, it is no longer in a constitutional
federalist relationship with the Union. In this case, the unrepublican state is
more akin to a territory seeking admission as a new state. The process of
admitting a new state generally begins with a congressional enabling act that
establishes a process by which the territory will hold a state constitutional
convention and elections for state officers and congressional representatives.
The enabling act also includes conditions for admission to statehood,
including conditions of specific constitutional provisions the state is required
to incorporate into its state constitution.283
The permissible use of this enforcement mechanism is extremely
restricted. Here, the Necessary and Proper Clause actually performs a critical
limiting function.284 It is only necessary to dissolve a state government and
reconstitute the state’s constitution when faced with a total breakdown in
republican government and the state’s unwillingness or inability to
implement voluntary or federally mandated reforms. It is only proper to do
so when the democratic relationship between the state and its people is
broken, such as when the state’s franchise is not a republican representation
280. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
52 U.S.C.).
281. The Supreme Court did not hold that a federal preclearance scheme is unconstitutional
in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Rather, it held that any such scheme must
be justified by current conditions. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 553.
282. As Chief Justice John Marshall opined, “the government of the Union . . . is,
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 404–05 (1819). This was a recurrent theme in his jurisprudence: the federal
government represents the people of the United States as national citizens, not as citizens of
individual states. See id.; see also Amar, supra note 29, at 751.
283. Biber, supra note 237, at 128.
284. In the context of the Guarantee Clause, the necessary and proper analysis may take on
a sort of proportionality analysis, as Ryan Williams’s work suggests. See Williams, supra note
30, at 634. If indeed the guarantee reads as an international treaty-type commitment, as he
posits, then the use of force to exercise that guarantee would be subject to international law
rules of proportionality. See id. at 608–11.
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of the democratic majority or its electoral system is completely corrupt. In
this case, making state officials responsive to the federal government, as
opposed to their constituency, does not interfere with an otherwise existing
republican relationship between the state and its people. Put differently,
where there is no state government “in constitutional relations with the
Union, it [becomes] the duty of the United States to provide for the
restoration of such a government.”285
At the same time, neither violence nor secession is a necessary precursor
to the constitutional use of this enforcement mechanism. The clause
guarantees a republican form of government to “every State in this Union,”
meaning a state is subject to even the most extreme exercise of the guarantee
power while it is still in the Union. And while the guarantee would certainly
operate to prevent unrepublican changes effectuated through state-sanctioned
violence, such violence is not a necessary predicate to enforcing the
guarantee through dissolution and reconstitution. The cure for a breakdown
in republicanism is, firstly, other democratic mechanisms of restoring
republican rule, such as federal incentives or legislation. But where the state
government prevents a republican change in representation, even without
resort to violence, then the government is no longer in the hands of the people
and is subject to federal takeover.286
Finally, though the clause permits dissolution of a state government and
state constitution, it does not empower the federal government to eject a state
from the Union. Such power is not only outside the scope of the clear
language, purpose, and history of the Guarantee Clause, it is at odds with the
very structure of the Constitution, which, “in all its provisions, looks to an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”287 The people of a
state remain entitled to all the protections and privileges statehood provides,
including the federal guarantee of a republican form of government, which
conditions some of the privileges of states on their fulfilling their own
constitutional obligations.288
What kind of situation would warrant this remedy today? The prospect of
civil war and secession is tragically not such a farcical fear in this time of
extreme political polarization. The idea of states adopting governments
resembling the antebellum Southern slave aristocracies is, thankfully, more
outlandish. There are, however, other equally unrepublican, if not
comparably savage, forms of government that realistically threaten to take
hold. Part II discussed the widespread unrepublican practices of partisan
gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement. Such practices should be
285. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729 (1868).
286. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 48, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that
the guarantee would only apply to prevent changes effectuated by violence, insofar as “the
whole power of the government is in the hands of the people”). Thus, while the “natural cure
for an ill administration, in a popular or representative constitution, is a change in men,”
where there is no representative constitution, the federal government must compel a change
in men even absent a breakout of violence. See id. (emphasis added).
287. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 725.
288. See id.
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the object of federal action under the Guarantee Clause pursuant to
Congress’s legislative, spending, and potentially, seating powers. But only
more total and intractable unrepublican schemes merit state reconstruction,
such as the propagation of a political caste system or corrupt electoral
democracy.
The potential reemergence of such antirepublican schemes is unfortunately
no longer unimaginable. Some state officials in recent years have signaled
the prospect of total republican breakdown in their states by threatening to
cancel or disregard elections, refusing to comply with federal law, or
disempowering a political party that has been duly elected. No example of
this disturbing trend is starker than the recent attempts by various state
lawmakers to overturn the outcome of the 2020 presidential election in their
states.289 These subversive maneuvers came on the heels of numerous
attempts by states to throw out hundreds of thousands of legally cast ballots
in an effort to alter the outcome of the 2020 election.290 After their candidate
lost the presidency, hundreds of state lawmakers propagated the lie that the
election was stolen.291 This lie sparked a deadly insurrectionist attack on the
U.S. Capitol building while the vice president and Congress tallied the
electoral votes.292
Such antirepublican schemes have been building for years. Last year,
Wisconsin leaders forced citizens to brave death and disease from the
COVID-19 virus to vote in a special election for a state supreme court
vacancy in an effort to tip the odds of securing a conservative majority on

289. See, e.g., Dartunorro Clark, Arizona GOP Lawmaker Introduces Bill to Give
Legislature Power to Toss out Election Results, NBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/arizona-gop-lawmaker-introduces-billgive-legislature-power-toss-out-n1256097 [https://perma.cc/K8ME-3SAB]; Nick Corasaniti,
Pennsylvania G.O.P.’s Push for More Power over Judiciary Raises Alarms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/15/us/politics/pennsylvania-republicans.html
[https://perma.cc/G7TF-S56E].
290. See, e.g., Amy Gardner, Ga. Secretary of State Says Fellow Republicans Are
Pressuring Him to Find Ways to Exclude Ballots, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/brad-raffensperger-georgiavote/2020/11/16/6b6cb2f4-283e-11eb-8fa2-06e7cbb145c0_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
U25C-XRSP]; Eric Tucker, Voting Lawsuits Pile up Across US as Election Approaches,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 30, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-virusoutbreak-donald-trump-voting-lawsuits-124eca1b346c2fa64f6add1710031ec4
[https://perma.cc/7T8L-SG6G]; Alana Wise, Republicans Seek to Toss out 127,000 Ballots in
Democratic-Leaning Texas County, NPR (Nov. 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/
11/01/930052598/republicans-seek-to-toss-out-127-000-ballots-in-democratic-leaning-texascounty [https://perma.cc/FFT3-N4MW].
291. See, e.g., Matt Vasilogambro, GOP Lawmakers in 28 States, Including Pa., Have
Introduced More than 100 Bills Seeking to Restrict Ballot Access, PENN. CAP.-STAR (Feb. 16,
2021), https://www.penncapital-star.com/government-politics/gop-lawmakers-in-28-stateshave-introduced-more-than-100-bills-seeking-to-restrict-ballot-access-analysis/
[https://perma.cc/3SY5-553R].
292. See, e.g., Dan Barry et al., “Our President Wants Us Here”: The Mob That Stormed
the Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitolrioters.html [https://perma.cc/38BP-G62E].
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that court.293 In the aftermath of the 2018 and 2016 election cycles, at least
four state legislatures controlled by one party attempted to disempower a duly
elected governor of the opposing party by stripping the governor of executive
powers and corrupting the redistricting process.294 In Kentucky’s last
gubernatorial election, incumbent governor Matt Bevin threatened to not
leave office upon very narrowly losing reelection.295 Two other recent
elections raised the serious possibility of a state cancelling or stealing a
statewide election when the controlling party confronted defeat at the polls:
one, when Republicans advocated for cancelling the 2017 Alabama Senate
race,296 and another, when Republicans considered overturning the results of
the 2016 North Carolina governor’s race.297 At the same time, state officials
are increasingly disregarding federal laws with which they disagree, such as
when Supreme Court of Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore refused to enforce
the constitutional right to same-sex marriage.298
These escalating antirepublican threats and machinations are dangerous
and corrupting. For now, they mostly remain the individual blusters of
ideologues as opposed to the wholesale corruption of republican government
in any one state. But they portend looming republican crises, especially in
battleground states, that may eventually warrant federal takeover and
reconstruction.
IV. THE SEPARATION OF THE GUARANTEE POWER
The Constitution vests the guarantee power in the United States,
contemplating a role for each of the federal branches to guarantee a
republican form of government to every state.299 It is the only time the
Constitution gives the United States a constitutional command. As the
obligation rests on the three branches in their composite form, it is shared
according to the basic tripartite division of federal power established in
293. See Astead W. Herndon & Jim Rutenberg, Wisconsin Election Fight Heralds a
National Battle Over Virus-Era Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/06/us/politics/wisconsin-primary-voting-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/5NUSQWPG].
294. These states are Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. See Klarman,
supra note 128, at 60–62.
295. See Jonathan Martin, Democrats Win Control in Virginia and Claim Narrow Victory
in Kentucky Governor’s Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/05/us/politics/ky-va-ms-elections-recap.html?auth=login-google
[https://perma.cc/7JZ7-6MER].
296. See Sean Sullivan et al., National Republican Move Against Roy Moore Grows—but
Key Alabama Republicans Are Not Joining In, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/paul-ryan-joins-gop-calls-for-roy-moore-toend-campaign-amid-sexual-misconduct-allegations/2017/11/14/65a4c824-c951-11e7-aa9654417592cf72_story.html [https://perma.cc/WE5U-6PK5].
297. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, N.C. Governor Wants Recounts, Though Signs Point to
Cooper Win, CNN (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/22/politics/north-carolinagovernor-race-recount-pat-mccrory-roy-cooper/index.html [https://perma.cc/GK8K-BQZD].
298. See Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Chief Justice, Suspended Over Gay
Marriage Order, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/roymoore-alabama-chief-justice.html [https://perma.cc/7LLP-CGYN].
299. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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Articles I, II, and III. Congress has the dominant role in enforcing the
guarantee pursuant to its primary responsibility for overseeing national
policy and calibrating federal relations.300 The executive and judiciary are
charged with implementing and administering Congress’s agenda.301
This allotment of power under the Guarantee Clause is mandated by the
explicit textual delegation to Congress of the power to make all laws for
carrying into execution “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States.”302 It is also implied from the character of
the powers assigned to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches,
including the assignment of nearly all matters of policy, security, and
interstate affairs to Congress in Articles I and IV. Founding-era Supreme
Court cases confirm Congress’s primary role in discharging the duties
entrusted to the federal government.303 Thereafter, an unbroken line of cases
and executive branch precedent specifically affirm Congress’s prerogative to
enforce the Guarantee Clause.304 Finally, multiple generations of Americans
have endorsed Congress’s role as the primary enforcer of structural political
rights by ratifying constitutional amendments vesting Congress with the
authority to enforce such rights.305
As these amendments recognize, the assignment of power to Congress to
effectuate political process rights comports with the Constitution’s separation
of powers and is most compatible with the institutional competencies of the
three branches. Contrary to widespread scholarly opinion, the judiciary is
quite ill equipped to review and to enforce the Guarantee Clause. The very
nature of the guarantee power, therefore, demands judicial restraint. While
courts have a proper checking role to play, as one part of the manifold checks
and balances that interconnectedly constrain Congress’s discretion under the
Guarantee Clause, it would be improper for the courts to take a heavy hand
in reviewing or exercising the guarantee power. Hard review threatens to
dilute the clause out of existence, and enforcement of the guarantee from the
bench, while permissible, risks poorly implemented, unaccountable, and
politically disastrous reforms.306
300. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 48, at 253 (James Madison) (“In republican
government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.”).
301. U.S. CONST. arts. II–III.
302. Id. art. I, § 8.
303. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 434–36 (1819).
304. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118, 138 (1912); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649–51 (1871); Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1868);
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 76–77 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 475, 500–01 (1866); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–43 (1849).
305. See Amar, supra note 198, at 119.
306. A separate question concerns the role of the executive branch in enforcing the
Guarantee Clause. Congress rejected the notion that the president has independent authority
to enforce the guarantee in the Wade-Davis Bill of 1864, which claimed the reconstruction
power for Congress alone. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3450 (1864) (statement of
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A. Congressional Predominance
The assignment to Congress of principal authority to enforce the
Guarantee Clause is a valuable allocation of constitutional power. It
leverages institutional competencies, democratic accountability, and
competing institutional incentives to ensure the power is viable but not overly
perilous. Congress is best suited to determine whether a state is
unrepublican, and how to reform it, because these are quintessential political
questions that fall squarely within the legislative domain.307 They require
political calculi and negotiation, as well as policy ingenuity and expertise.
Congress’s legitimacy over these matters is furthered by the relative
transparency and accountability of its operations. Congressional action is
generally open to public view and allows a prompt appeal to the people
through a biennial election cycle.308 It is also the branch most responsive to
mass movements and most partnered with civil society, which permits a
larger share of popular influence over congressional lawmaking, from policy
inception to post hoc review. It is perhaps for these reasons that the dominant
periods of constitutional transition in this country have stemmed from
legislative action supported by a groundswell of popular support, including
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights era. These transitions can
claim a popular mandate that executive and judicially managed constitutional
changes have never enjoyed.309 Popular reaffirmation boosts the legal
legitimacy of a practice, which in turn pulls other governing institutions in
line. This process of snowballing legitimacy is how Congress has
successfully revised constitutional norms through legislative feats.310
What momentum Congress gains from its institutional competency and
popular support, however, is usefully checked by its institutional
Sen. Benjamin Wade). The law passed in both chambers but was pocket vetoed by President
Abraham Lincoln. See COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 2. The executive branch itself came to the
same conclusion in a memo prepared for President Franklin D. Roosevelt amidst a breakdown
in republican government in Louisiana under Governor Huey Long. Memorandum from
Alexander Holtzoff to the Att’y Gen. (Apr. 8, 1935). Consistent with the tripartite division of
power under the Guarantee Clause, it is for Congress to make the first move under the clause,
at least where the target state remains in the Union and is not subject to invasion or insurrection
(which is dealt with in separate constitutional provisions and which the president has delegated
authority to address under the Militia Acts of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (May 2, 1792); ch. 33,
1 Stat. 271 (May 8, 1792)).
307. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 768–69 (“Congress has both the expertise and
experience to enforce the Guarantee Clause and to resolve the political matters it implicates.”).
308. While reelection is usually a poor correlate of public approval for any single
government action, especially when elections are subverted through antidemocratic tactics like
gerrymandering and vote denials, it is likely a decent indicator of public approval for
reconstruction legislation. Such legislation would be a banner policy initiative and therefore,
a top voting issue. It is also likely to make the next election cycle fairer and more
representative and thus, more indicative of the people’s stance on Congress’s record.
309. For example, the women’s rights movement has enjoyed greater success in the areas
of education and employment equality than it has in the area of reproductive justice. The
former was supported by popular appeal and congressional legislation; the latter has largely
been advanced by courts and continues to be beset by backlash.
310. See ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 17–25 (describing this process of constitutional
transformation).
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inefficiency. Congress is the least efficient branch, requiring majority
consent for any legislative action, and the branch most responsive to the
interests of the states. Being comprised of members accountable to state
constituencies, Congress has an institutional self-interest in exercising
restraint in its meddling in state affairs—after all, a vote to target a state is a
self-inflicted wound on a body comprised of state representatives. There is,
therefore, an internal détente, or mutually assured destruction, aspect to
congressional exercise of the guarantee power that valuably ratchets down
the political impetus to use it. In this way, vesting the guarantee power in
Congress is itself a built-in check on that power.
Scholars have argued, however, that political process rights, and voting
rights in particular, “cannot safely be left to our elected representatives, who
have an obvious vested interest in the status quo.”311 The argument assumes
that breakdowns in republican government are the type of political problem
a representative political body is unlikely to address.312 A similar criticism
worries that entrusting a political body with the power to alter the political
process will lead to self-dealing and self-entrenchment.313 In essence, these
objections assume that Congress is both least likely to enforce the guarantee
and most likely to abuse the guarantee power because the power permits
Congress to affect its own political prospects.
But both history and political psychology cast doubt on these objections to
granting Congress primary authority for ensuring republican government in
the states. As the Framers recognized, it is precisely because Congress has a
political incentive to use the guarantee power to aggrandize its own influence
that it should be vested there—with proper checks.314 In times of severe
republican rot, the electorate becomes both more closely divided and more
dramatically polarized. This phenomenon inevitably incentivizes one of the
major political parties—the one more reliant on broader popular support—to
enact republican reforms so as to gain the upper edge in a closely divided
electorate. It further incentivizes targeting specific states with the worst
republican track records because, in this environment, electoral shifts in just
a few states are likely to make a decisive difference in the Electoral College
and the composition of the Senate. Republican reform is politically feasible,
therefore, because it is political.315
311. ELY, supra note 26, at 117.
312. See Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 876 (“The challenges that will arise . . . over
whether a state violates the Guarantee Clause . . . are the ones that Congress is virtually certain
not to address.”).
313. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 651, 669–70.
314. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 48, at 252 (James Madison) (“Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to controul the abuses of government.”).
315. Sandy Levinson has proposed a different method of constitutional reconstruction,
which is to convene a new constitutional convention. But legislative action pursuant to the
guarantee power can accomplish the same constitutional reforms as a convention and, for the
reasons outlined, is far more politically feasible than convincing two-thirds of the states to call
for a convention against self-interest. The republican rot in the states makes it harder to elect
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While it is not certain that during every republican crisis the party that is
politically positioned to desire republican reforms will come to power, the
rapid oscillation of political power that attends these periods makes it likely
that at some point during the crisis, that party will hold a majority. These
large swings are the result of that same political phenomenon of an electorate
that is simultaneously closely divided and deeply polarized. The confluence
of these two traits in the electorate stimulates the renewed energy of base
voters, heightens the political involvement of previously apolitical actors,
and destabilizes the political allegiances of moderate voters as the parties
move to the poles. Such dramatic shifts in the electorate result in sudden and
dramatic shifts in the political landscape.
The American electorate has experienced these exact changes over the past
three decades—becoming at once extremely polarized and exceptionally
closely divided.316 This shift has, predictably, resulted in frequent swings in
power. Three times during this period, the political party with the incentive
to enact republican reforms has had unified control of government—
including now during the 117th Congress. That party is the Democratic Party
in this moment, just as it was the Republican Party in 1865. Certainly,
winning united control of the federal government requires the Democrats to
overcome the unrepublican obstacles discussed throughout this Article,
majorities of a reform party than it would be to get a majority in Congress. In addition,
Congress has a greater incentive to exert federal power over the states than states have to invite
federal intrusion. See Nancy Martorano Miller, One-Party Rule in 49 State Legislatures
Reflects Flaws in Democratic Process, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://theconversation.com/one-party-rule-in-49-state-legislatures-reflects-flaws-indemocratic-process-109395 [https://perma.cc/PRG2-RAZC] (showing how much harder it is
to overcome unrepublican lockup in state elections, as compared to federal elections).
316. See Klarman, supra note 128, at 71, 110, 155–56. Like the political environments of
Reconstruction and the New Deal, control of all three branches of government is now up for
grabs in most elections. The margins are so close that two of the last four presidents lost the
popular vote and three of the last five did not win a majority of the popular vote (Bill Clinton
received 43.01 percent in 1992 and 49.23 percent in 1996; George W. Bush received 0.51
percent fewer votes than Al Gore, amounting to 543,816 votes; and Donald Trump received
2.09 percent fewer votes than Hillary Clinton, amounting to 2,868,686 votes). See FEC,
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 92: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 9 (1993), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/federalelections92.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KAQ-M72V]; FEC, FEDERAL
ELECTIONS 96: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 11 (1997), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/
documents/federalelections96.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3X7-UVBB]; FEC, FEDERAL ELECTIONS
2000: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 11 (2001), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/
federalelections00.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DU5-5RMM]; FEC, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2016:
ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 5 (2017), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/
federalelections2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL4Z-EPWC]. Simultaneously, turnout in the last
five presidential elections jumped over seven percentage points from the four before that, and
the share of the electorate identifying as independent increased by 10 percent. PEW RSCH.
CTR., A DEEP DIVE INTO PARTY AFFILIATION 1–2 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/
politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/04/4-7-2015-Party-ID-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6YFW-FFMH]; Party Affiliation, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/partyaffiliation.aspx [https://perma.cc/6XHN-UPBD] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).

2021]

RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS

2219

including partisan gerrymandering, disenfranchisement, and the
malapportionment of the Senate and Electoral College. They are boosted,
however, by the cycles of political oscillation that characterize a deeply
polarized and closely divided electorate. The base of the party is energized
and prodemocracy reformers are well organized and well funded. In states
across the country, election reformers are beating the odds to create
independent redistricting commissions and put ethics, campaign finance, and
election access initiatives on the ballot.317 Democrats are also younger, more
diverse in an increasingly diverse country, and more closely aligned with a
majority of independent voters.318
It is inaccurate, therefore, to assume that those in power have no incentive
to reform the processes that put them in power. To the contrary, it is precisely
periods of republican crisis that create the incentives to enact republican
reforms and create a higher likelihood of political actors doing so. History
bears this out. Congress has not indefinitely resisted changes to the status
quo. Rather, it has quite consistently acted to expand and defend the
franchise precisely in moments where the political process is suffering
extreme distress. For example, it is clear that the Reconstruction Republicans
used the Guarantee Clause to usher in radical political reforms in the South
in an intertwined effort to effect social change and to expand their reach as a
national party.319 They understood the political reality that permitting Black
Americans to vote in the South would keep Confederate elites from being
elected and undoing the work of Reconstruction.320 The republican crisis
that caused deep political division thus worked to incentivize pro-republican
reform.
The same story repeated itself in the early part of the twentieth century.
Republican rot stemming from massive disenfranchisement and political
corruption, along with extreme partisan polarization, spurred Progressive-era
Republicans to secure the direct election of senators,321 the initiative and
referendum, and the enfranchisement of women. It was a new Republican
majority elected to both the House and Senate in 1919 that immediately set
about ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment to shore up the party’s political
support in the upcoming 1920 presidential election.322 In the civil rights era,
a Democratic Congress and president acted to address the dramatically
317. Ten states have already adopted independent redistricting commissions: Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, and
Washington. Independent Redistricting Commissions, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Independent_redistricting_commissions [https://perma.cc/6AH3-N678] (last visited Mar. 16,
2021).
318. 46 percent of independents (representing 17 percent of the total population) lean
toward the Democratic Party, while 35 percent (representing 13 percent of the total
population) lean Republican. John Laloggia, 6 Facts About U.S. Political Independents, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (May 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/15/facts-aboutus-political-independents/ [https://perma.cc/W5QY-3EMP].
319. See Biber, supra note 237, at 144–47.
320. See id.
321. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 409–15.
322. See id. at 423–26.
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unrepublican disenfranchisement of Black Americans by passing sweeping
voting rights reforms that upended established federalist relations.323 Their
reforms had the quite intentional consequence of also expanding Democratic
power in the South.324 Again, during the Vietnam War, a time of intense
political strife and republican infirmity, as young citizens dying for their
country abroad were denied the right to help shape it at home, a Democratic
Congress lowered the voting age to eighteen in all state and local elections
ahead of the hotly contested 1972 election cycle.325 The Supreme Court
struck down this law and was promptly overruled by legislative and popular
command with the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.326
This same confluence of party interest and republican distress has also
driven Congress to usher in critical periods of broader constitutional reform.
The founding, Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights era were all
the culminations of periods “of political agitation that prepared the way for a
decade of decisive change” led by Congress.327 These transformations
progressively shifted the United States away from “a decentralized federal
system enabling white men to pursue their self-interest within a market
economy,”328 toward a strong national government with the power to ensure
equality and economic welfare—but that remains captured by oligarchical
interests and aristocratic political processes. Congress (or a legislative body
like the Constitutional Convention) was a necessary engine of these badly
needed transformations in the past precisely because such transformations
were political, and politically advantageous, in nature.329
That there is a political valence to republican reform, or constitutional
reform more broadly, should not be off-putting. Most republican reforms are
wolves dressed in wolves’ clothing. Reconstruction that affords a political
advantage should not be immediately dismissed as devolution into an
autocratic power grab. The Reconstructionists were not autocrats, even as
they cemented their power through republican reforms because, like the New
Deal Democrats and civil rights leaders after them, they did not perpetuate
their political power by delegitimizing democracy, stifling majority rule, or
suppressing government transparency and accountability. To the contrary,
they pursued political approval the quintessentially democratic way: by
enacting popular reforms that expanded the democratic legitimacy of
government.330
At the same time, the potential for abuse of the guarantee power is checked
by various restraints. Besides the built-in inertia to use the guarantee power
sparingly, congressional action must overcome various internal dissent
323. See id. at 441–45.
324. See id. at 444–45.
325. See id. at 445–47.
326. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1970).
327. ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 7.
328. Id. at 8.
329. Even the New Deal, which was primarily led by President Roosevelt, was carried out
with the full institutional and political backing of a majority of the Congress. See id. at 24.
330. See id. at 20–22.
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mechanisms, including constitutional requirements like majority rule and
parliamentary hurdles innate to the committee system and to the debate and
amendment processes. There are also prolific external checks on Congress’s
guarantee power: the presidential veto, executive nonenforcement, judicial
review, public opinion, and mass mobilization, to name a few. The
separation of parties, just as much as the separation of powers, also serves as
a crucial check on a power that requires immense political capital and
strategic planning. Each of these checks has proven especially potent in
times of divided government and political polarization. These checks ensure
that Congress’s use of the Guarantee Clause, like its use of its Article I
powers, comports with popular demand and constitutional limitations.
B. Judicial Restraint
The textual delegation of the guarantee power to Congress, coupled with
Congress’s unique institutional capacity to exercise this power, supports a
limited role for the courts in both reviewing congressional action under the
clause and in exercising the guarantee power from the bench. The Supreme
Court is fairly ill suited to the tasks of reviewing and enforcing a power to
develop political process rights. On the reviewing side, the Court is
accustomed to constraining congressional action to conform with
conventional constitutional boundaries. But this is particularly inappropriate
when reviewing a power that permits improvements to our constitutional
scheme. On the enforcement side, the Court has proven itself doctrinally and
institutionally ill equipped to protect political process rights in times of
republican crisis. The Court is not prohibited by the Constitution to reverse
course and develop the doctrinal framework for fulfilling the federal
government’s guarantee obligation. But its track record illustrates the folly
in expecting, or even desiring, the Court to get into the business of enforcing
the Guarantee Clause.
1. Modest Review
A circumscribed review process is vital for reviewing a power whose very
purpose is to usher in major changes to state governments. Such reforms are
likely to be novel and to upend constitutional norms. They will inevitably
have some effect on both individual and structural constitutional rights. This
is permissible under the Guarantee Clause in pursuit of safeguarding
republican government in the states. Holding Congress to current
understandings of rights and limits, therefore, would essentially amputate the
Guarantee Clause from the Constitution. If the Court does not give sufficient
discretion to Congress to alter constitutional norms pursuant to the Guarantee
Clause, it will rewrite that power in the guise of reviewing it.
The Court’s proper role in reviewing Guarantee Clause legislation,
therefore, is not to ensure Congress comports precisely with the
constitutional status quo but to ensure it is not abusing its power in pursuit of
republican reform. There is no room between these limits for most exercises
of congressional authority: if Congress oversteps its bounds, it has abused
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its power. The Guarantee Clause is slightly different, however. Because it
permits Congress to define the meaning of republican government, it
inherently empowers Congress to reevaluate constitutional norms to bring
the states into alignment with republican principles. What the clause does
not permit is for Congress to use this power pretextually for the purpose of
self-entrenchment or self-aggrandizement. The Court, therefore, must serve
as a classic check on congressional power—meaning as a guardian against
abuse of that power—without serving in its typical role as a steward of
conventional constitutional boundaries.
There are three inflection points in the use of the guarantee power and thus,
three places for possible abuse. The first is to determine what republican
government requires, the second is to establish whether a state is in violation
of this requirement, and the third is to select the means by which to correct
the violation. The first and third determinations are quintessential political
questions about which the Court should defer to Congress. These are
questions of evolving norms and values, of policy and of politics. They fall
squarely within Congress’s constitutional bailiwick and should be subject to
nothing more than rational basis review. The question here is solely whether
Congress’s criteria for republican government is rationally related to
enhancing the principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship and
whether the means selected is rationally related to enforcing that criteria.331
The second point of analysis—whether a state has violated the new
republican norm—is a question of fact and highly susceptible to pretextual
determinations. Evaluating this type of legislative finding is within the
judiciary’s core competence. Though the Court should view congressional
findings with deference, as it does when evaluating other legislative
enactments, it should examine the adequacy of these findings and, most
importantly, peek behind the legislative record to interrogate whether the
determination that a state’s republican form has devolved is a pretext for selfdealing or self-entrenchment. Courts regularly examine government motives
when reviewing whether a government action violates the Equal Protection
Clause or the First Amendment precisely because these rights protect against
the abuse of government discrimination.332 So too with political reform
pursuant to the Guarantee Clause. The abuse to be checked is the

331. The analysis ought, therefore, to resemble that which the Court uses for reviewing
legislation passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. Like the Guarantee Clause, the
Thirteenth Amendment grants a positive guarantee against slavery, which itself is a political
construct best left to Congress to define. Accordingly, the Court defers to Congress’s rational
determination as to “what are the badges and the incidents of slavery” and permits Congress
to act rationally to legislate against them. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
440 (1968).
332. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531–42 (1993) (examining governmental purpose for laws burdening religious exercise under
the Establishment Clause); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184–85 (1979) (examining government interests in the Equal Protection Clause context);
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring analysis of whether
governmental interest is related to the suppression of free expression).
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government’s use of this power to treat certain citizens’ political rights more
favorably than others’.333
Two examples illustrate the proper analysis.
Suppose Congress
determines that partisan gerrymandering is unrepublican and passes a law
banning its use in drawing state voting districts. The Court should review
the rationality of the determination that political gerrymandering violates the
principles of popular sovereignty and equal justice and that the means
selected for eliminating this practice are rationally related to accomplishing
that end. It must then take a closer look at whether partisan gerrymandering
is actually occurring in the states. If Congress can amass a record that it is
occuring, the Court should uphold the law. Conversely, imagine Congress
determines that overvoting is contrary to republican government and passes
a law requiring voters to present government-issued identification to vote.
The Court’s review of whether overvoting is unrepublican and whether the
hypothetical voter identification law is a proper means of correcting this
problem is limited to rational basis review. It must then take a closer look at
whether overvoting is actually occurring in the states. If the problem is a
pretextual excuse for imposing a politically convenient law, the Court must
exercise its constitutional checking function and strike down the law as an
abuse of the guarantee power.
These examples also illustrate, by way of juxtaposition, how the Supreme
Court has recently fundamentally erred in reviewing similar legislation. In
Crawford v. Marian County Election Board,334 the Court upheld Indiana’s
stringent voter photo identification law without requiring Indiana to present
any real evidence that voter impersonation fraud was occurring in the
state.335 The Court rightly accepted the state’s determination that voter fraud
is a legitimate problem states may address and that an identification law may
help address the problem, but it refused to peek behind the curtain to see if
the problem existed in the state at all.336 The Court also reasoned that the
partisan nature of the law is of no avail so long as a valid, nonpartisan
rationale is offered.337 Certainly, the partisan valence of a law is not a reason
in itself to strike it down. But by focusing solely on the legal justification
for the law, as opposed to its factual justification, the Court failed to
333. Only two scholars have engaged with this question of the appropriate standard of
review, though both somewhat cursorily. Adam Kurland agrees the courts should review
Guarantee Clause legislation under rational basis review, drawing on the standard the Supreme
Court used to review Reconstruction legislation in White. See Kurland, supra note 127, at
458–59. Mark Alexander also cautions deference but goes further, taking the position that the
power is textually committed to Congress and therefore nonreviewable under the political
question doctrine. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 826–27. His analysis seems to interweave
the policy reasons for judicial nonenforcement of the Guarantee Clause with judicial
nonreview of Guarantee Clause legislation. Though the political question doctrine is
employed to abstain both from judicial enforcement of a right and judicial review of
congressional or executive action, the reasons for abstention in each context are different, as
explained below.
334. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
335. See id. at 191–97.
336. See id. at 194–96.
337. See id. at 203–04.
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distinguish partisan abuse from political reform. The Court made the same
analytical error in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute,338 in upholding an
Ohio law that removed voters from the state’s voter rolls if they had not voted
in the last two elections and failed to return a postcard.339 Again, the Court
rightly deferred to Ohio on whether voter roll accuracy is a legitimate
concern, but it shirked its checking responsibility by disregarding entirely the
fact that voter roll inaccuracy is not a problem in Ohio and that the state’s
solution to this fictitious problem was not rationally related to solving it.340
In reality, the postcard system produced massive and racially biased
inaccuracies in the rolls.341
Judicial modesty in this area is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
understanding of the limits of its jurisdictional competence to address
questions of a fundamentally political nature. As seminally articulated in
Baker v. Carr,342 the political question doctrine holds that claims that require
the Court to make decisions the Constitution assigns to the political branches
fall outside the Court’s Article III jurisdiction.343 An act of Congress under
the Guarantee Clause is not immunized from review by the political question
doctrine; actions taken by the political branches that have a substantial effect
on states or individuals rarely should be. But the same underlying policy
considerations for political question abstention are present when the Court
reviews an act pursuant to the guarantee power.344 In particular, a more
robust review of Guarantee Clause legislation will require the courts to make
judgments about the republican health of states. There are likely few
judicially manageable standards for this, which risks drawing the Court into
the thorniest of political thickets and sparking a catastrophic loss of trust and
institutional integrity.345 The political question doctrine is therefore
instructive for why courts should demonstrate heightened judicial humility
when reviewing Congress’s exercise of the guarantee power.
This was undoubtedly the Supreme Court’s calculus during
Reconstruction when it sidestepped reviewing Congress’s use of the
guarantee power to dismantle and reconfigure the ex-Confederate states. The
Reconstruction Court’s refusal to review Congress’s ratification scheme for
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was particularly proper. Perhaps
counterintuitively, judicial restraint is especially warranted where Congress
acts to enforce the guarantee by inducing states to pass a constitutional
amendment. The amendment process is the only tool available to the political
338. 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018).
339. See id. at 1841–48.
340. See id. at 1847.
341. See id. at 1864 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
342. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
343. See id. at 209–11.
344. Though some have suggested the political question doctrine is waning, the Court’s
full-throated embrace of the doctrine in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), puts
a stop in that dam.
345. See infra Part IV.B; see also Hasen, supra note 197, at 206 (“The Court might not
want to open itself up to Guarantee Clause claims, which will draw the Court even further in
the political thicket.”).
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branches to check the Supreme Court’s authority to say what the Constitution
means. It is for this reason that the Court refrains from reviewing the Article
V amendment process. Where Congress effectuates an amendment under
Article V via the guarantee power, therefore, it is vital to the system of checks
and balances that the Court abstain from reviewing that use of the guarantee
power.346 In this one context, Congress’s actions cross the line from meriting
deferential treatment to being unreviewable.
Though giving Congress wide discretion to make structural political
changes in the states would recalibrate current separation of powers doctrine,
there is less cause for concern than might immediately appear.347 The
Supreme Court has far more often struck down or whittled away necessary
reforms than been a guardian of republican rights against congressional
overreach.348 Time and again, it has truncated the scope of constitutional
rights and refused to interpret capacious rights language in the Constitution,
well, capaciously. It has written out of the Constitution fundamental rights,
including those protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it has significantly diminished Congress’s
rights-enforcement authority.349 Where it has struck down congressional
overreach, it has mostly done so to vindicate economic liberty as opposed to
political equality. Altering the balance of power between the judiciary and
Congress under the Guarantee Clause, therefore, is more likely to enhance,
rather than diminish, the advancement of political process rights.
2. The Empty Promise of Judicial Enforcement
Whether federal courts should be involved in enforcing the guarantee
power in the first instance is a different question, but it is one that raises many
of the same issues of judicial competence. The Supreme Court has a long
and nearly unbroken line of precedent declaring the Guarantee Clause
nonjusticiable.350 The reasoning underlying these decisions has been the
subject of nearly universal criticism by scholars for the past half century.351
Yet, as these scholars have argued for the clause’s justiciability, eagerness
for a judicial solution to antirepublican transgressions by states has crowded
out any serious reflection on whether the Court is a desirable or effective
vehicle for republican reform.
A holistic and candid assessment of the Court’s record in defending and
expanding political equality reveals a sorry tradition of preventing,
curtailing, or ignoring deeply needed political reforms. In case after case, the
346. See Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 854, 859, 870.
347. Hasen, supra note 197, at 206 (“Interpreting the Guarantee Clause to give Congress
essentially carte blanche to make structural changes in the political process without Supreme
Court oversight would work a fundamental change in Congress-Court relations.”).
348. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980); Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S.
74, 79–80 (1930); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
351. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Court proves itself at best a mediocre champion of political rights and at
worst, a complicit, if not active, perpetrator of political oppression. To wit,
one of the only times the Court reviewed a Guarantee Clause claim, it held
that denying women the right to vote did not render a state government
unrepublican.352 At the same time, at the height of the Jim Crow era, the
Court neutered the Privileges or Immunities Clause, cabined the Fourteenth
Amendment’s reach to affirmative state action, and sanctioned extreme racial
inequality and segregation.353 Thereafter, the Court endorsed literacy tests
and poll taxes as prerequisites for voting.354 It continued to tolerate political
subjugation and violence well into the twentieth century, including by
acquiescing to the forceable denial of political and civil rights, upholding
white primaries, and suppressing free speech and assembly.355 The trajectory
of the Court’s track record has never really improved. Over the past fifty
years, it has not only permitted but actively exacerbated disenfranchisement
and political inequality, while undercutting Congress’s ability to enact civil
rights reforms.356 The explanations for this miserable record are many and
sometimes idiosyncratic, attributable perhaps to an unlucky confluence of
timing, personalities, and political reality. But the principle causes of the
Court’s failures in this area are institutional—they are the direct result of
structural disadvantages and doctrinal flaws.
First, as scholars of political entrenchment have increasingly brought to
light, the Court has developed few analytical tools for resolving structural
political problems by having committed itself to a doctrine that myopically
reviews such questions solely through an individual rights framework.357
This self-inflicted wound on the Court’s competence has led to an amassing
of jurisdictional safety valves, including the political question doctrine and
the generalized grievance doctrine of standing, that remove the Court entirely
from safeguarding the health of the democratic process. Indeed, the few
times the Court has vindicated political process rights, it only accomplished
352. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175–76 (1874).
353. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17–19 (1883); The SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80–82 (1873).
354. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 365–66 (1915); Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213, 221–25 (1898).
355. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1944) (sanctioning the forcible
internment of Japanese-Americans), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1935) (upholding the white primary), overruled in
part by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52–
53 (1919) (permitting the punishment of political speech); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 554–55 (1876) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against private
suppression of constitutional rights).
356. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–08 (2019); Husted v. A. Philip
Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1843–44 (2018); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 814–18 (2015); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185,
218–23 (2014); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553–55 (2013); Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
200–03 (2007); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 652–53 (1976) (per curiam).
357. See supra note 27.
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this result because the political harm at issue was amenable to correction
through an individual rights analysis under the Equal Protection Clause or
the Fifteenth Amendment.358
Even if the Supreme Court were to develop the appropriate doctrinal
standards for enforcing the Guarantee Clause, however, it would find it
difficult to apply such standards in a manageable and evenhanded fashion.359
This is true as a matter of legal doctrine and institutional structure. First, as
a matter of doctrine, there is no principled interpretive methodology for
determining the contemporary meaning and requirements of republican
government that is divorced from baseline political assumptions. For
example, there is no legal formula for why partisan gerrymandering violates
republicanism while majority-minority districts or term limits do not. All
three work extraconstitutional, state-imposed limitations on the people’s
choice of representatives. The answer lies in policy determinations about
what best serves political equality.
The Guarantee Clause is thus ill suited for judicial enforcement because
its standards rely on political assessments. The power is bounded by nothing
more than the meaning of republican government, which is an indefinite and
evolving political concept. Its indefiniteness alone is not judicially
unmanageable; the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are equally
indeterminate. But unlike those clauses that relate to common-law rights, the
guarantee of republican government refers to a contemporary set of
politically constructed rights.
The guarantee power, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, was designed to
keep states within the specturm of contemporary republican norms—and
there is no apolitical formula for defining that specturm. It is the
contemporary political norms, not legal standards, that explain how slavery
was apparently consistent with republicanism—until it was not—and why,
when it no longer was, women’s disenfranchisement was still unproblematic,
until that too fell out of republican repute, even as young adults continued to
be denied the vote. All of these practices violated popular sovereignty and
equal citizenship, but those are political, not legal, principles. And while
drawing these kinds of socially constructed lines is not a problem for
Congress as a policymaking representative body, it is more difficult and
problematic for courts to do so.
358. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183–87
(1979); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (holding a barrier to the ballot violated a
candidate’s individual rights under the Equal Protection Clause); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 149 (1972); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating poll
taxes in state elections under the Equal Protection Clause); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
576 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5–8 (1964) (eliminating malapportionment
under the Equal Protection Clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340–41 (1960) (holding racial gerrymanders unconstitutional under
the Fifteenth Amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (striking down white
primaries under the Fifteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause); Guinn, 238 U.S.
at 363–64 (invalidating grandfather clauses under the Fifteenth Amendment).
359. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217–18 (reasoning that Guarantee Clause claims are
nonjusticiable because they lack discoverable and manageable standards).
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Second, beyond the doctrinal difficulties in enforcing the Guarantee
Clause, the Supreme Court is also institutionally ill suited to the task. The
Court is an unrepresentative, unelected political body cloaked in the garb of
a neutral arbiter. The Constitution designed it as such. It is part of an
independent branch whose composition, jurisdiction, and regulations are
controlled almost entirely by political processes. It does not operate
impartially so much as autonomously, according to political ambitions and
agendas. This design renders the Court neither legitimately political nor truly
apolitical, putting it at an awkward disadvantage when it comes to the task of
defining contemporary political norms.
The first hurdle this design presents is that it ensures the Court will
exercise the guarantee power through the lens of the Justices’ political priors
but provides them with no political accountability mechanisms that would
benefit their analyses. Lacking meaningful transparency, accountability, and
representativeness, the Court is more likely to err in its political calculus
about when and how to fulfill the guarantee. Worse still, any such attempts
risk catastrophic institutional damage. The Court’s power depends on public
acceptance of its legitimacy, which itself depends on the Court maintaining
a mirage of impartiality. Where the Court appears overtly political, it
weakens public confidence and with it, its own authority. The Court appears
to have understood this predicament recently when declining to intervene in
the practice of partisan gerrymandering so as to avoid political
pronouncements that risked undermining the public perception of judicial
neutrality.360
The Court’s lawmaking authority is also less suited to devising republican
reforms. Its ability to pronounce legal reforms is highly constrained by the
procedural posture and issues presented in the cases before it. Case-by-case
review cabins courts’ remedial discretion to mostly two options: upholding
or invalidating the specific practice before them. It rarely permits the sort of
fine-tuned and imaginative solutions required to remediate republican rot. A
legislative body, conversely, has the authority to investigate political
problems holistically, in their varying origins and iterations, and to craft
nuanced and comprehensive reform programs that need not have a tight fit
with remedying one specific political injury.
Indeed, it was not any of the Court’s holdings expanding political process
rights in the civil rights era—including its invalidation of malapportionment,
racial disenfranchisement measures, and barriers to ballot access—that had
anywhere near the democratizing impact of the suite of civil rights legislation
Congress enacted. The crown jewel of Congress’s legislative assault on the
racist republican rot infecting the states at that time was the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. That Act alone outlawed literacy and moral character tests,
penalized public and private vote suppression tactics, and set up a system of
federal preclearance, observation, and voter registration in problematic

360. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500 (holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable political questions).

2021]

RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS

2229

districts.361 As a result of the Act, a quarter million Black Americans
registered to vote the same year the law passed; within three years, the
number of registered Black Americans doubled in the South; within twenty
years, the number of Black Americans elected to the South’s state legislatures
grew from three to 176.362 By abandoning a case-by-case approach for
sweeping, federalized reform, Congress did what the Court had not for over
one hundred years.
Finally, the Court is not well positioned to respond to political crises, and
the guarantee power is essentially a republican emergency response power.
This is true for many of the reasons just articulated: the Court is least able to
negotiate political solutions or to act in an overtly political manner. It is also
true because the Court requires far more time than the political branches to
review and respond to an emergency. It is possible to circumvent the lengthy
timeline of litigation through emergency petitions, but doing so would do
nothing to address why the Court requires time in the first instance. It is
underresourced and inexperienced at resolving issues without the benefit of
the record that litigation produces. It is no wonder, therefore, that again and
again, the Court proves incapable of or unwilling to resolve national or
immediate political crises.
All these observations are not necessarily meant to identify undesirable
traits in how the Court operates or to provide an especially negative
assessment of the Court’s role. They are rather meant to point out that the
Court is fairly ill suited to address the republican rot in America today. Its
limited doctrinal framework and weak historical record show it is a poor
overseer of political process rights. This conclusion is also not meant to
suggest that there is no role for the Court to play in enforcing the Guarantee
Clause. Litigants should continue to press the Court to develop new doctrine
to protect political process rights on a parallel track with the political
branches and the states. What this analysis does argue is that placing all our
eggs in the basket of judicial activism is highly improvident—it is a strategy
with little chance of success that could only ever deliver incremental reform,
while diverting our best legal and political resources away from the more
viable avenue for accomplishing seismic, systemic reforms. Legislative
intervention is a far more potent tool for resetting democracy than judicial
tinkering. When republican reforms are within the majority party’s political
interest, there is no more powerful lever for breaking a cycle of tit-for-tat
political devolution and engaging in a full reset of constitutional
republicanism.
361. Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 precisely because the Supreme Court
continuously failed to address the systemic disenfranchisement of minority voters. See
Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of “Judicially Unmanageable” Standards in Election Cases
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1500–01 (2002).
362. Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black
Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 111, 112 (1991); see also
AMIE JAMIESON ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF
NOVEMBER
2000
(2002),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YVJ7-KN2S].
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The Guarantee Clause, then, is not so much an “empty vessel” absent
judicial enforcement, as it has so often been described; it is instead a
legislative vessel in which to pour our modern notions of popular sovereignty
and equal citizenship. This was always the intended function of the clause.
Writing in 1807, John Adams affirmed that the word republican “is so loose
and indefinite that successive predominant factions will put glosses and
constructions upon it as different as light and darkness.”363 The power to
gloss the Constitution resides in the people; and the power to test new
constructions of the clause properly belongs in Congress.
CONCLUSION
From the founders to the Reconstructionists, progressive era reformers,
New Deal Democrats, and civil rights champions, multiple generations of
Americans have periodically asserted the right to redefine the rules of the
Republic. Their mission has been symbiotically destructive and restorative,
centered on recalibrating state authority and expanding equal sovereignty.
Through this work, our systems of government have endured grave episodes
of republican rot. They have endured because they have adapted. As
Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s The Leopard explains: for things to remain the
same, everything must change.364 And everything can change quite rapidly
when conditions are right—as they are right now.
Indeed, the conditions are not only ripe, they are fleeting. For republican
government to survive, its modern failures must be addressed without delay.
The place to start is a large-scale reconstruction of our political economy at
the state level under the Guarantee Clause, which will have the effect of
making the federal government less polarized and dysfunctional. To this end,
the new Democratic Congress should pass laws under the Guarantee Clause
reforming districting and protecting access to the ballot. It should further
incentivize states to enfranchise all their adult citizens, limit political
entrenchment and the anticompetitive lockup of democratic markets, and
reduce the influence of money on governance. Congress should also send
constitutional amendments to the states, along with incentives to ratify those
amendments, addressing outmoded provisions that increasingly work
unrepublican harm to the nation, including abolishing the Electoral College,
reconfiguring the Senate, and adding explicit protections for political process
rights.
Congress, not the judiciary, is the right institution to lead this work.
Scholars, policymakers, and activists ought, therefore, to focus less on
litigation strategies for protecting our elections and more on developing the
details of systemic political process reforms. In the guide of Reconstruction,
part of this work must include critically rethinking the structural relationships
between the federal branches, the federal and state governments, and the
363. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 20, 1807), in 4 COLLECTIONS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 332, 353 (Boston, Mass. Hist. Soc’y ser. 5 1878).
364. See GIUSEPPE DI LAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD 40 (Archibald Colquhoun trans., William
Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1960) (1958).
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people and their governments to more robustly safeguard popular
sovereignty and equal citizenship. The Guarantee Clause offers the most
direct and viable path forward for implementing such reforms.

